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I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of Vietnam’s political economy is unlike that of
any other nation in the world today. No other country has endured
so much uncertainty, hostility, occupation, civil war, political transi-
tion, or rapid economic change. If the time period from 1842
through 1975 in Vietnam was marked by a struggle for indepen-
dence, then the period from 1975 to 2013 can be described as a
period of maintenance and flourishing of a dynamic capitalist na-
tion. As the world’s 13th largest population with approximately
87.84 million people,1 the second largest producer of coffee in the
world,2 fifth largest producer of rice,3 a major producer of crude oil,
and durable goods, Vietnam’s economic prowess is well established.
Given the tremendous pace at which economic growth had been
realized since national independence in 1975, the successes of Viet-
* Joshua M. Steinfeld is a doctoral candidate in the School of Public Administra-
tion at Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton, Florida. Khi V. THAI, Ph.D., is
Professor and Director of the School of Public Administration, and Interim Director,
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, at Florida Atlantic University.
1. General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Population and Employment in 2011 http:/
/www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=467&idmid=3&ItemID=12941
2. Sylvie Doutriaux, Charles Geisler, and Gerald Shively. “Competing for Coffee
Space: Development-Induced Displacement in the Central Highlands of Vietnam,” Ru-
ral Sociology, 73:4  (2008), p. 528.
3. International Rice Research Institute, 2010 http://irri.org/index.php?option=
com_k2&view=item&id=12094&lang=en.
(1)
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nam’s socialist-communist political form of government serve as an
example for developing nations around the world. While western
nations such as the United States and England experienced a trans-
formation from an agricultural to industrialized economy over the
course of more than a century, Vietnam remarkably underwent a
full cycle of industrialization and market reform in less than 40
years.
Before market reform was plausible, government reform took
place in the midst of French colonization and United States inter-
vention during the First and Second Indochina Wars. When Presi-
dent Diem was assassinated in 1963, conflict between the militant
Buddhists and the Saigon government of South Vietnam erupted.4
A chain of political reforms and uncertainty prevailed until 1966
when General NGUYEN Van Thieu and Air Marshal NGUYEN
Cao Ky came to power and immobilized the Buddhist opposition.
From the beginning of heightened armed conflict in 1955 to
Vietnam’s independence in 1975, the national economy grew at a
remarkably steady rate, which was impressive considering that over
1 million Vietnamese men were killed from 1965-1975. In addition,
industrial centers and infrastructure were constantly under attack
or closely monitored by invading forces. On April 25, 1976, the first
election was held in Vietnam in 30 years, legitimizing the political
institutions within the newly formed, autonomous Socialist Repub-
lic of Vietnam (SRV).5
Economically, the 1976-1980 five-year plan sought to organize
the nation’s production facilities into agricultural cooperatives that
were aimed at correcting food shortages and optimizing the state’s
resources. The economic reorganization, which involved land redis-
tribution and forced collectivization, disenfranchised and eventually
discriminated against the minority ethnic Chinese, called “Hoa
Kieu,” who dominated factors of production under French rule,
based on their elite status as compared to the ethnic Vietnamese.
During the same period, intermittent foreign investment from
China and the Soviet Union served as vital economic stimulus to a
country recovering from war. China and the Soviet Union com-
peted for Vietnam’s loyalty, and the result was a brief conflict be-
tween China and Vietnam where Vietnam invaded Chinese-ruled
4. Mark Moyar, “Political Monks: The Militant Buddhist Movement During the
Vietnam War,” Modern Asian Studies, 38:4 (2004), p. 752.
5. Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 1976. Inter-Parliamentary Union http://www.ipu.
org/parline-e/reports/arc/VIETNAM_1976.PDF.
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Cambodia in December 1978 and China retaliated in February
1979.
Dependency on the agricultural sector proved to be a failure as
industrial output decreased as a result of several mitigating factors
related to Vietnam’s closed economic system, where the state con-
trolled all forms of production and commerce. The 1981-1985 five-
year plan sought to recognize an economy that consisted of multiple
sectors: the state, collective, and individual entities.6 Through priva-
tization efforts Vietnam’s labor force became incentivized resulting
in steady agricultural and industrial growth from 1981-1985. How-
ever, the absence of a free market system spurred the onset of infla-
tionary woes, where prices continued to increase because of the
government’s demand and access to unlimited mediums of
exchange.
In December 1986, the Vietnamese Communist Party endorsed
economic renovation, known as doi moi. Vietnam encouraged for-
eign direct investment and market reforms were gradually imple-
mented toward a capitalist system. The agricultural sector was
decollectivized and a household economy was developed beginning
with the Land Law of 1993, when farmers and other producers were
given the right to both lease land and make their own business deci-
sions irrespective of state involvement. The state-owned enterprises
began downsizing, which paved the way for the “street-food revolu-
tion” and the propping up of city merchants and small businesses.7
International trade within the region emerged to support the needs
of small businesses, especially the influx of second-hand
motorcycles from Cambodia.8
Several banking reforms were instituted to combat inflation
and stimulate economic growth through debt financing activities.
Financial markets for securities trading were established, along with
regulatory bodies such as the State Securities Commission. Acceler-
ated economic growth left some Vietnamese citizens as benefi-
ciaries, while others found it difficult to consume staple goods given
6. PHAM Xuan Nam, Be Viet DANG, and Geoffrey B. Hainsworth, “Rural De-
velopment in Viet Nam: The Search For Sustainable Livelihoods,” in Peter Boothroyd
and PHAM Xuan Nam, eds., Socioeconomic Renovation in Viet Nam: The Origin,
Evolution, and Impact of Doi Moi, International Development Research Center, 2000,
p. 15.
7. Bill Hayton, Vietnam: Rising Dragon, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010,
p. 51.
8. Melanie Beresford and DANG Phong, Economic Transition in Vietnam: Trade
and Aid in the Demise of a Centrally Planned Economy, Cheltenham, United Kingdom:
Edward Elgar, 2000, p. 127.
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the increasing prices amidst a roaring economy. The wealth gap ex-
acerbated and several welfare programs were initiated in the 1990’s,
including efforts to train and educate the workforce, which would
enable Vietnam’s conscientious transition from agricultural to in-
dustrial production.
As heavy industry and manufacturing began to flourish, and
Vietnam demonstrated a commitment to openness. Vietnam joined
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the same
year that the United States lifted its trade embargo with Vietnam in
1995. Meanwhile, concerns of environmental protection began to
flourish, thereby sparking the establishment of the National Envi-
ronmental Agency in 1995. Vietnam was rapidly becoming a dy-
namic social and economic state.
In 1997, the Asian Currency Crisis hit the region and foreign
investment decreased by 50% from 1997 to 1998.9 In response, Vi-
etnam devalued its currency three times and implemented policies
to oversee central banking activities, credit institutions, and circula-
tion of currency. Foreign direct investment began to flow back into
Vietnam, and by 1999 the total value of Vietnam’s exports had in-
creased five-fold since 1990 while its gross domestic product (GDP)
averaged 10% year-over-year increases for the 1990’s decade.
The success of doi moi had the effect of shifting the state’s fo-
cus from quantitative growth to sustainable socio-economic devel-
opment, which was outlined in the 2001-2010 Socio-Economic
Strategy Development Plan. The five main objectives of the Strat-
egy were to continue the rapid growth of the economy in order to
increase domestic savings rates, increase citizens’ accessibility to ed-
ucation and training, enlarge the modern technological capacity of
the nation, improve infrastructure, and combat rampant corruption.
Public budgeting allocations were made to mimic the main
objectives.
Increases in productive capacity quickly led to environmental
hazards that threatened the viability of Vietnam’s expansive water-
shed and susceptible coastal zones. Other challenges to Vietnam’s
socio-economic development rose when the ethnic Vietnamese, or
Kinh, aggressively migrated to the Dak Lak province in hopes of
participating in the coffee rush. The mass migration, which was en-
couraged by the central government, led to poor treatment of those
indigenous to the Central Highlands, the Ede population.
9. Gerald TAN, ASEAN Economic Development and Cooperation (2nd ed.), Sin-
gapore: Times Academic Press, 2000, p. 206.
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Today, Vietnam faces three major challenges: corruption, the
South China maritime dispute, and the growing unhappiness of
Vietnamese citizens. Vietnam’s swift transition toward privatization
and a free market economy introduced a new transactional rela-
tionship between business owners and government officials and cor-
ruptive practices flourished. Administrative and legal reforms
sought to address the abundance of corruption, which posed as a
major obstacle to attaining the transparency needed for Vietnam to
fruitfully engage the global marketplace. Public policies aimed at
creating a rights-based as opposed to rule-based legal system were
coupled with an emphasis on academic and cultural understanding
through incremental steps toward separating the singular political
party from administrative activities. In 2001, the Public Administra-
tion Reform (PAR) Master Program was implemented. The same
year, the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) came
into being, which served as a “stepping stone” to Vietnamese acces-
sion into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007, which ef-
fectively opened Vietnam’s market economy to the rest of the
world.
The South China Sea maritime dispute is a regional conflict
with global implications. China’s claim over the entire Sea has led
the United States as the superpower, and Russia as the supplier, to
serve integral naval roles in Vietnam’s own steadfast claim to the
South China Sea. Taiwan and several ASEAN members have also
laid claim to parts of the disputed sea territory, including the
Paracel and Spratly Islands. In addition to rights of passage, at the
heart of the maritime dispute are the exploration and drilling privi-
leges associated with ownership of the respective continental shelf.
Public-private partnerships involving Vietnam or China with for-
eign state-owned oil producers, have the potential to escalate the
conflict.
While a significant amount of government resources are di-
rected towards the maritime dispute, economic conditions in Viet-
nam have wavered. Foreign investment flows into Vietnam have
remained strong but resulted in uncertain monetary policies, while
inflation continues to stress consumers. Simultaneously, the
Vietnamese population is experiencing drastic increases in non-
communicable disease (NCD), such as cardiovascular disease and
diabetes, remain largely undiagnosed across the nation. Prevention
and awareness have been slowly received, as mass communication
in Vietnam remains a source of discontent. Freedom of speech and
\\jciprod01\productn\A\AOP\13-3\AOP301.txt unknown Seq: 6  8-OCT-13 13:44
6 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
democratic characteristics of governance continue to be hotly con-
tested issues in Vietnam.
An appropriate strategy for Vietnam to combat its challenges
is likely to emanate from an examination of past achievements and
obstacles overcome in the past. Vietnam has demonstrated its abil-
ity to not only be resilient, but also excel, given the geopolitical
environment at-hand. Through its experiences, conclusions emerge
that may lead Vietnam to a prosperous future.
II. POLITICS AND RESISTANCE SINCE THE FRENCH
INDOCHINA WAR
The willingness of United States Presidents to try and imple-
ment authoritarian policies in attempts to instill western ideology
on the eastern hemisphere was evident during the Indochina and
Vietnam War. The First Indochina War, or as the Vietnamese call it,
the Nine-Year National Resistance, can be divided into four phases,
each of which ended with ever-worsening French military defeats
and ever-increasing United States interventions.10 By the end of the
French war in Vietnam, the United States was paying 80% of
France’s financial cost to engage Vietnam.11 The United States was
interfering with Vietnam’s declaration of independence from
French colonialism, and imperialism that dated back to January 5,
1862 under the Treaty of Saigon.
In the August Revolution of 1945, Vietnamese leader HO Chi
Minh and his army, the Viet Minh, took over Hanoi in the northern
Red River Delta region, effectively weakening the French front. In
order to gain support from the newly conquered communist in-
clined northern territory of Vietnam, HO Chi Minh set up a parlia-
ment consisting of both democratic and communist seats under the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam government. For many
Vietnamese, including conscious anti-communists, the choice now
seemed to have narrowed down to a stark one: allow the discredited
French to return, or join the Viet Minh.12 Just after the August
Revolution of 1945, HO Chi Minh declared Vietnam’s indepen-
dence from France in an unanswered telegraph to United States
10. NGO Vinh Long, “Vietnam’s Revolutionary Tradition,” in Marvin E. Gettle-
man, ed., Vietnam and America: A Documented History (2nd ed.), New York: Grove
Press, pp. 5, 36.
11. Marvin E. Gettleman, Jane Franklin, Marilyn B. Young, and Bruce H. Franklin,
Vietnam and America: A Documented History (2nd ed.), New York: Grove Press, 1995,
pp. 3, 49.
12. Joes, War for South Vietnam, supra note 2, pp. 17-18.
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President Harry S. Truman. French aggression in Vietnam did not
go away and in desperation, the Viet Minh accepted support from
an unlikely supporter from the north –  China.
From 111 B.C. to A.D. 939, Vietnam was ruled by China. Fi-
nally, the Vietnamese in the Red River Delta gained their indepen-
dence and gradually expanded the nation south to the Mekong
River Delta. After the victory of MAO Tse-Tung in 1949, the
Vietnamese resistance movement began to receive military and
other forms of aid from China to help in the fight against the
French and then the United States.
Disillusionment with the spread of Chinese policies into Viet-
nam started in economics by way of agrarian reform.13 In northern
Vietnam, land reform was the new socio-economic question. There
were two opposing agrarian systems at the time: one in the north
and center, with small properties, and one in the south, where the
farmland consisted of big estates.14 In 1952, the Chinese enacted
their Bolshevik ideology of “land to the tiller” in Vietnam, in which
the land of the Mekong River Delta was to be forcefully redis-
tributed to migrants from the Red River Delta. It was at this point
that the United States began changing its stance in Vietnam.15
The totalitarian nature of an agrarian state was widely consid-
ered to be a staple of communism. At this time, the United States
flip-flopped from a policy of financing bombardment against, to full
military support of the Republic of Vietnam against the northern-
based Viet Minh. Just a few years prior, the Viet Minh was based in
the south of the country, originally a fully democratic government
entity. What was originally a democratic political organization led
by HO Chi Minh in the southern Mekong River Delta became a
communist political organization led by the Chinese in the northern
Red River Delta once the Viet Minh moved north and took over
Hanoi.16 The United States had first chosen to support French im-
perialism rather than democracy in Vietnam. And, when the Viet
Minh accepted communism in exchange for Chinese wartime aid,
13. P. J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, 2nd Printing, Cambridge, MA: The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1963, p. 12.
14. Pierre Brocheux, Ho Chi Minh, A Biography, Claire Duiker, Translation, New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 152.
15. General VO Nguyen Giap, “Vietnamese Victory: Dien Bien Phu,” in Marvin E.
Gettleman, ed., Vietnam and America: A Documented History, New York: Grove Press,
1995, p. 54.
16. Joes, War For South Vietnam, supra note 1, pp. 17-18.
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the United States began to support the Republic of Vietnam (South
Vietnam), the original territory of the Viet Minh.
From 1955 to 1963, NGO Dinh Diem was the first President of
South Vietnam. Following his assassination on November 1, 1963,
the South Vietnam political system fell into a state of disarray. The
conflict between the Buddhists and the Saigon government began
on May 8, 1963, when nine civilians were killed at a Buddhist pro-
test led by monk THICH Tri Quang, who was reporting to the press
that the Diem government was oppressing Buddhists.17 Diem re-
fused to make concessions to the Buddhists and a plot conceived by
several senior generals resulted in Diem being put to death.18 On
January 30, 1964, the General NGUYEN Khanh government was
established when Khanh overthrew General Minh, who had as-
sumed leadership after Diem’s death. In early 1964, the militant
Buddhists formed a single association known as the Institute for the
Propagation of the Buddhist Faith, making several demands to the
Khanh government. Buddhist leader THICH Tri Quang led a coali-
tion meant to represent the three to four million Buddhists of South
Vietnam, of a total population of about 15 million, against Khanh’s
government, which was aligned with the United States’ political
interests.
On December 19, 1964, Khanh and a group of young generals
called the “Young Turks” requested that the High National Council
retire all military officials with more than twenty-five years of ser-
vice because of their lack of talent and sympathy towards the mili-
tant Buddhists. The High National Council denied the request and
the Young Turks dissolved the Council by arresting its members.19
Unites States Ambassador Taylor denounced the dissolution of the
High National Council, citing that it was inconsistent with the sta-
bility that America wanted from the South Vietnamese govern-
ment. Khanh asserted that South Vietnam was not an American
satellite, and Taylor responded by saying he had lost confidence in
Khanh.20
In retaliation, Khanh launched a fierce anti-American propa-
ganda campaign over Vietnamese radio in which he declared that it
17. Moyar, “Political Monks,” supra note 1, p. 752.
18. Moyar, “Political Monks,” supra note 2, p. 752.
19. CIA Watch Office to State, December 25, 1964. DDRS. Fiche, 132C; Historical
Division of the Joint Secretariat, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam,
Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1970, p. 5, ch. 15.
20. Memcon, FRUS, December 1964, 1964-1968, Vol. 1, Doc. 454; Saigon to State,
December 1964, DDRS, 1979, fiche 206D.
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was “better to live poor but proud as free citizens of an indepen-
dent country rather than in ease and shame as slaves of the foreign-
ers and Communists.”21 On January 6, 1965, based upon army
coercion, political control was turned over to a new government led
by TRAN Van Huong.22 Subsequently, Khanh joined THICH Tri
Quang and the Buddhist faction in an effort to subvert the govern-
ment in place.23 Shortly thereafter, on January 20, 1965, THICH Tri
Quang announced a hunger strike until Huong stepped down.
THICH Thien Minh, THICH Tri Quang’s closest comrade, added
that the Buddhists would soon “call for peace,” which was a form of
Communist propaganda aimed at questioning South Vietnam’s will
to continue to wage war.24 In Hue, around January 23, 1965, 5,000
demonstrators penetrated the United States Information Service
Library. In Da Nang, militant Buddhists THICH Tri Quang and
NHA Trang pressured shop and restaurant owners to deny service
to Americans.25
On January 27, 1965, Khanh used the heightened conflict be-
tween THICH Tri Quang’s militant Buddhists and the United
States as a diversion to plan a bloodless coup with the support of
General NGUYEN Chanh Thi and Air Marshal NGUYEN Cao Ky
against the TRAN Van Huong government. United States Deputy
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson warned Khanh against such action
because the United States supported Huong. Khanh pressed for-
ward, but was unable to garner support from either the United
States or the militant Buddhists, who instead supported the Armed
Forces Council’s decision to order Khanh to leave the country.
Having long been favored by THICH Tri Quang, the militant
Buddhist leader still at bay, Dr. PHAN Huy Quat assumed leader-
ship. Quat dispersed his authority across the military, which pre-
vented any single officer from having too much power, thereby
stabilizing the political situation to an extent not seen since the
Diem regime.26 A new political crisis ensued in Saigon at the end of
21. Saigon to State, December 22, 1964, NA II, RG 59, Central Files, 1964-1966,
box 2949.
22. Saigon to State, January 12, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. 2, doc. 24; Saigon to
State, January 12, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. 2, doc. 29.
23. CIA, THICH Tri Quang’s Campaign to Bring Down the TRAN Van Huong
Government, January 21, 1965, DDRS, 1976, fiche 24E.
24. Moyar, “Political Monks,” supra note 3, p. 774; Saigon to State. January 20,
1965. LBJL, NSF, VNCF, Box 12.
25. Moyar, “Political Monks,” supra note 4, p. 774
26. CIA, The Situation in Vietnam, February 26, 1965, DDRS, 1983, fiche, 91; CIA,
Individuals and Cliques in South Vietnam, February 25, 1965, LBJL, NSF, VCNF.
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May 1965 when Chief of State PHAN Khac Suu blocked an attempt
by Quat to replace two incompetent ministers.27 Suu rejected
Quat’s favoritism towards militant Buddhists and on June 9, 1965,
Quat appealed to South Vietnamese generals to mediate the dis-
pute.28 Conversely, the generals were upset with the political inef-
fectiveness of the militarily decentralized, civilian government
under Quat and encouraged him to step down and turn the govern-
ment over to the military.29 General Thi and Air Marshal Ky be-
came prime minister and executive chairman, respectively, while
General Thieu ruled over the committee of generals.
The new leaders immediately instituted a “no breathing” week
where civil liberties were suspended and troublemakers ordered
shot.30 The population was organized under paramilitary rule by in-
fusing the civil administration with staunch guidance on how to
treat the militant Buddhist opposition. General Ky even banished
THICH Tri Quang to a mountain retreat, at which time the South
Vietnamese government finally ended its showdown with the mili-
tant Buddhists. The suppression of militant Buddhists in 1966 made
possible a greater degree of political cohesion in South Vietnam.31
Finally, the NGUYEN Cao Ky-NGUYEN Van Thieu government
lasted from June 9, 1965 until Saigon fell to North Vietnamese
forces in 1975.32
The escalation of the Vietnam War, also known as the Second
Indochina War, was an incremental process. After France aban-
doned its imperialist motives in 1954 when it was beaten badly by
North Vietnam in Dien Bien Phu, the Lao Dong political party, led
by HO Chi Minh, gained tremendous support from constituents. In
fact, millions of peasants were willing to fight for his policies. Mean-
while, the National Liberalization Front was HO Chi Minh’s politi-
cal arm in the South, and mostly consisted of small cells with
anywhere from three to ten soldiers. In comparison in the South,
27. Saigon to State, May 25, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 2, doc. 314; CIA. The
Situation in South Vietnam, May 26, 1965, DDRS, 1979, fiche 244A.
28. Pentagon Papers, Vol. 2, 434; CIA. The Situation in South Vietnam, June 9,
1965, LBJL, NSF, VNCF, box 18.
29. Ural Alexis Johnson and Jef Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power:
The Memoirs of an American Diplomat, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994.
30. Moyar, “Political Monks,” supra note 5, pp. 781-782.
31. Moyar, “Political Monks,” supra note 6, p. 784.
32. YONG Mun Cheong, The Political Structures of the Independent States. In
Nicholas Tarling, ed., The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: The Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries (Volume 2), Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,
1992, p. 394.
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scholarship and intellectual pursuits offered better alternatives;
bearing arms was not highly regarded.33 As an indication, a total of
twenty-seven political parties and advocacy groups existed in Viet-
nam by the end of 1969.34
There was some level of national unity in Vietnam as a result
of the National Assemblies of 1946, 1960, and 1964. However, the
failure to re-elect southern deputies to the fourth National Assem-
bly of 1971 symbolized the division between the North and South.
The formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government
(PRG) by the Vietcong regime in the South along with the strength
of the Lao Dong party’s commitment to the Viet Minh regime in
the north effectively foiled any unification efforts.
The United States was intent on stopping any possibility of
North Vietnam’s Communist dominance spreading to South Viet-
nam or neighboring countries. On August 2, 1964, three North
Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats of the 135th Torpedo Squadron en-
gaged the USS Maddox, apparently mistaking it for a South
Vietnamese coastal patrol boat that had launched an amphibious
raid on the Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands just a few days before,
on July 30, 1964. The Maddox and four United States F-8 Crusader
fighter jets were launched from the Ticonderoga aircraft carrier and
attacked the torpedo boats, killing six North Vietnamese sailors and
wounding six more. On August 4, 1964, a second incident occurred
in the Gulf involving Task Group 72.1 (USS Maddox and USS C.
Turner Joy) where two Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)
patrol boats were eventually sunk after the naval destroyers re-
ported radar sightings of three unidentified aircraft and two uniden-
tified naval vessels, presumably belonging to the DRV.35 On
August 7, 1964, the United States Congress passed the Gulf of Ton-
kin Resolution, authorizing President Lyndon B. Johnson to take
military action in order to retaliate, enforce, and promote the main-
tenance of international security in Southeast Asia, providing a le-
gal basis for the United States’ involvement in a Vietnam War.36
First moving from a position of simply providing military advice to
the regime ruling in the south, to providing supporting troops, and
33. IBID
34. IBID, p. 395.
35. “Military Pressures Against North Vietnam, February 1964-January 1965,” The
Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Vol. 3, Section 2, The First Incident, pp. 106-268.
36. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1961-1968, U.S.
Involvement in the Vietnam War: the Gulf of Tonkin and Escalation, 1964 http://his
tory.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/gulfoftonkin.
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then gradually increasing the number of troops to the point where
the incursion became a war between the United States and north-
ern Vietnam, the United States never formally declared war.37
No retelling of the saga of United States’ involvement in Viet-
nam would be complete without alluding to Tim O’Brien’s lyrical
chronicle of his own experiences as a combat soldier: “I’d come to
this war a quiet thoughtful sort of person, a college grad, Phi Beta
Kappa and summa cum laude, but after seven months in the bush I
realized that those high civilized trappings had somehow been
crushed under the weight of simple daily realities. I’d turn mean
inside.”38 O’Brien juxtaposed life in the “bush,” with his previous
life as an academic. Plaudits like Phi Beta Kappa did not matter.
After seven months in Vietnam, he realized he was capable of evil
and reduced to simplicities like Vietnam’s bush.
The Vietnam War extracted a heavy toll from the United
States: a body count of 58,220 American soldiers killed and 153,303
wounded. Meanwhile, Vietnam’s casualty toll from the First Indo-
china War and Second Indochina War was 2,744,000 people.39
The war also extracted a heavy economic toll, especially during
the most intense period of warfare. In the south, rice paddy output
decreased from 5 million tons in 1962 to 4.3 million tons in 1968.40
In the north, where industry was more prevalent, cement produc-
tion, for example, decreased from 594,500 tons in 1964 to only
70,000 tons in 1968.41 Agriculture in the north was less impacted by
the United States bombing since the northern dyke system was not
specifically targeted. Additionally, aid from China and the Soviet
Union was flowing to northern Vietnam, which amounted to nearly
half of its GDP.
Military and other wartime efforts were closely intertwined
with economic activity in Vietnam for several reasons. By 1960,
37. Michael Hill, The Public Policy Process (5th ed.), Edinburgh Gate, England:
2009, p. 122.
38. Tim O’Brien, The Things They Carried (2009 ed.), New York: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, 1990, p. 190.
39. Anne Leland and Mari-Jana Oboroceanu, Congressional Research Service Re-
port for Congress, Washington, DC: Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for
Information Operations and Reports, February 26, 2010, p. 11.
40. TRAN Van Tho, Kinh te Viet Nam 1955-2000 [Vietnamese economy 1955-
2000], Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Thong ke, 2000, p. 247.
41. TRAN Van Tho, Kinh te Viet Nam 1955-2000 [Vietnamese economy 1955-
2000], Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Thong ke, 2000, pp. 257-258.
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86% of the rural households belonged to cooperatives.42 Distur-
bances in the supply chain would negatively affect an entire com-
munity. Furthermore, United States military personnel consumed a
significant proportion of the products and services produced in Vi-
etnam. Nonetheless, United States military involvement was ex-
tremely detrimental for Vietnam’s short-term and long-term
economic environment, especially in the case of Agent Orange.
Vietnam’s history extends thousands of years. A fragment, a
shard, is represented by the Armageddon inflicted on the people of
Vietnam; a mere ten years in the case of Agent Orange, which will
considerably and hideously, outlast all prior attacks on the coun-
try.43 Agent Orange is an herbicide containing Dioxin, a collective
name for 75 different poly-chlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins and 135
different poly-chlorinated dibenzo furans, known to cause birth de-
fects and severe deterioration of human health. The specific Dioxin
contained in Agent Orange was derived from 2,3,7,8 te-
trachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD), the most toxic.44 The scientific
properties of TCDD make its destruction last for an infinite amount
of time. Dioxins are slow to evaporate, do not dissolve readily in
water, and are often found bound to sediment or other organic sub-
stances in lakes and rivers several years later.45
A discussion between President Roosevelt and White House
Chief of Staff Admiral William D. Leahy resulted in the determina-
tion that Agent Orange should not be used against the Japanese.
Despite this, in 1961 President Kennedy signed two orders allowing
Agent Orange to be used in Vietnam: one order to destroy crops,
and another order to defoliate the jungle.46 The United States
dumped 19 million gallons of Agent Orange on Vietnam in at-
tempts to defoliate the jungle, which had provided canopy cover
42. VU Tuan Anh and TRAN Thi Van Anh, Kinh te ho: lich su va trien vong phat
trien [The household economy: history and development potential], Hanoi: Nha xuat ban
Khoa hoc Xa hoi, 1997, p. 75.
43. Philip Jones Griffiths, Agent Orange: Collateral Damage in Vietnam, London:
Trollwy Ltd., 2003, p. 152.
44. Peter Blumler, Dioxin: Severso, Vietnam, and Everyday Exposure, Lecture,
Canterbury, England: University of Kent, 2000, pp. 2, 14 http:www.econmr.org/data
pool/page/30/dioxin.pdf.
45. Peter Blumler, Dioxin: Severso, Vietnam, and Everyday Exposure, Lecture,
Canterbury, England: University of Kent, 2000, pp. 2, 14 http:www.econmr.org/data
pool/page/30/dioxin.pdf.
46. Gary D. Moore, Agent Orange Talking Paper #1. Smiths Creek, MI: Michigan
Agent Orange Commission, August 21, 2009, par. 5 http://www.gmasw.com/aotalk1.
htm.
\\jciprod01\productn\A\AOP\13-3\AOP301.txt unknown Seq: 14  8-OCT-13 13:44
14 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
and hiding places for the Vietnamese. The lethal effects of Dioxin
exposure have been passed from generation to generation and led
to more than 100,000 birth defects recorded in Vietnam.
Economically, Agent Orange and the war hurt the economy
both short and long-term. It is estimated that over 10 million hect-
ares of cultivated land and 5 million hectares of forest were dam-
aged. Meanwhile, in the north for example, all the railways, bridges,
industrial centers, main roads, sea and river ports had been de-
stroyed by bombings.47 Destruction to Vietnam’s infrastructure was
especially poignant considering that substantial infrastructure and
capital improvement projects were completed from 1955 to 1960,
including dozens of new drainage and pumping stations, several hy-
draulic dams, and major irrigation projects.48 For the long term, the
social and health cost of birth defects and health related problems
attributed to Agent Orange exposure has been tremendous and dif-
ficult to put a number on.
Despite United States aggression in Vietnam over the course
of three decades, Vietnam’s economy managed to grow steadily
from 1955-1975. Vietnam’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of
1.9% over said period, compared to 2.1% for China, 3.2% for Thai-
land, 6.2% for Taiwan, 5.2% for South Korea, and 8% for Japan.49
The ability for Vietnam to grow, given its agriculturally dominant
economy, is impressive considering that there was a shortage of
men in an agricultural system reliant on large amounts of manual
labor. It is estimated that due to the large number of Vietnamese
men killed, between 800,000 to 1,200,000 men from 1965-1975
alone,50 women outnumbered men by as much as 20%.51
47. Kathleen Gough, Political Economy in Vietnam, Berkeley: Folklore Institute,
1990, pp. 3-4.
48. General NGUYEN Tien Hung, Economic Development of Socialist Vietnam,
1955-1980, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977, p. 45.
49. Van Tho TRA,. “Long-term economic statistics of Vietnam before reunification:
1955-1975,” in J.P. Bassiono, J.D. Giacometti, and K. Odaka, eds., Quantitative Eco-
nomic History of Vietnam: 1900-1990, Tokyo: Hitotsubashi University, 1999. For other
countries gross domestic product average annual growth: Nicholas Crafts. East Asian
growth before and after the crisis, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, No. 46,
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1999.
50. Charles Hirschman, Samuel Preston, and Vu Manh Loi, “Vietnamese Casualties
during the American War,” Population and Development Review, 21:4 (1995), pp. 783-
812.
51. Judith Banister, Vietnam Population Dynamics and Prospects, Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California- Berkeley, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1993, p. 9.
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III. MOVING TOWARD MARKET ECONOMY
On April 30, 1975, at 4:03 AM, two United States Marines
were killed at Saigon’s Tan Son Nhut airport by a rocket attack; the
last United States casualties of the war. By dawn, the United States
embassy was evacuated and then ransacked by looters. A few hours
later, North Vietnamese Army tanks rolled into Saigon ending the
war.52 For the first time since French colonization began in 1862,
Vietnam was unified and independent. The northern-based Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam merged with the southern-based Re-
public of Vietnam to form the autonomous Socialist Republic of
Vietnam.
The first nation-wide election since the country’s inaugural
election of January 6, 1946 was held thirty years later on April 25,
1976. The Vietnam Fatherland Front, political party of the north,
nominated 308 candidates for 249 northern seats while the National
Liberation Front and the Vietnam Alliance of National, Demo-
cratic, and Peaceful Forces, a political party of the south, nominated
297 candidates for 243 southern seats. Of the 492 total deputy seats,
women occupied 132 seats and men between the ages of 21 to 35
years old occupied 127 seats. The new National Assembly of the
SRV commenced on June 24, 1976.53
Political institutions within the SRV adhered to the influence
of the Vietnamese Communist Party, which became hierarchically
organized based upon Leninist principles of democratic centralism.
For example, candidates for both local and national elected govern-
ment positions required the approval of the Vietnam Fatherland
Front, an arm of the Communist Party.54 The number of candidates
at elections varied; in many cases there was only one candidate on
the ballot. Provincial and city administrations interacted in local
government matters with authority approximately equal to the cen-
tral government ministry.55
Economic and political activities following the war were largely
influenced by Chinese methods. The SRV’s 1976-1980 five-year
plan, aimed to mimic China’s “five-year” increment planning sys-
tem, sought to reorganize localized agricultural cooperatives in the
52. Public Broadcasting Station, 2013. “Battlefield: Vietnam,” Timeline http://www.
pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/timeline/index4.html.
53. Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1976, Inter-Parliamentary Union http://www.ipu.
org/parline-e/reports/arc/VIETNAM_1976.PDF.
54. Adam Fforde and Stefan de Vylder, From Plan to Market: The Economic Tran-
sition in Vietnam, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996, p. 83.
55. Fforde and Vylder, From Plan to Market, supra note 1, p. 84.
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north into large-scale collective production facilities. The produc-
tion efforts were compartmentalized by function: each unit con-
trolled a specific aspect of the production process such as soil
preparation, seed breeding, harvesting, irrigation, and
extermination.56
The aggregated production methods instilled by the 1976-1980
five-year plan were much more efficient than those used by the lo-
calized cooperatives that were previously in place since 1960, which
brought 85.4% of all peasant households and 68% of total farmland
into some form of localized cooperative.57 While the local coopera-
tives were not very efficient, the landlord class, which consisted
mostly of ethnic Chinese known as Hoa Kieu, were intent on not
allowing Vietnamese peasant landowners “to ponder on their own
piece of land.”58 Less than five years prior, approximately 2.1 mil-
lion peasants had been distributed land from 1955-1957 as a result
of the 1954 liberation of North Vietnam and the “land to the tiller”
initiative.59 Between 1956 and 1972, 1,884,037 hectares of rice fields
were redistributed to approximately 1.3 million households in the
south.60
Even during French colonization, the Hoa Kieu controlled a
significant portion of economic activity and was granted certain
privileges under French rule. Comprising Vietnam’s largest minor-
ity, the Hoa Kieu population numbered about 1.3 million at war’s
56. PHAM Xuan Nam, Be Viet DANG, and Geoffrey B. Hainsworth, (2000) “Ru-
ral Development in Viet Nam: The Search For Sustainable Livelihoods,” in Peter
Boothroyd and PHAM Xuan Nam, eds., Socioeconomic Renovation in Viet Nam: The
Origin, Evolution, and Impact of Doi Moi, International Development Research
Center, 2000, p. 13.
57. PHAM Xuan Nam, Be Viet DANG, and Geoffrey B. Hainsworth, (2000) “Ru-
ral Development in Viet Nam: The Search For Sustainable Livelihoods,” in Peter
Boothroyd and PHAM Xuan Nam, eds., Socioeconomic Renovation in Viet Nam: The
Origin, Evolution, and Impact of Doi Moi. International Development Research
Center, 2000, p. 11.
58. Phong TRAN, Some Ideas on Capitalism in Northern Countryside Immediately
after Land Reform, Hanoi: Truth Publishing House, 1960.
59. PHAM Xuan Nam, Be Viet DANG, and Geoffrey B. Hainsworth, “Rural De-
velopment in Viet Nam: The Search For Sustainable Livelihoods,” in Peter Boothroyd
and PHAM Xuan Nam, eds., Socioeconomic Renovation in Viet Nam: The Origin,
Evolution, and Impact of Doi Moi. International Development Research Center, 2000,
p. 10.
60. NGUYEN Thu Sa, “Van de ruong dat o dong bang song Cuu Long [The land
problem in the Meking Delta],” in NGUYEN Quang Vinh, ed., Mien Nam trong su
nghiep doi moi cua ca nuoc [The south in the renovation task of the country], Hanoi:
Nha xuat ban Khoa hoc Xa hoi, 1990, p. 144.
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end in 1975.61 In the north, the Hoa Kieu represented about .5% of
the total population, and in the south, 5.5% of the total.62 While
only representing about 2% of the total population in Vietnam, the
Hoa Kieu owned the majority of small businesses, production facili-
ties, and distributorships. Subsequently, the SRV’s post-war politi-
cal and economic actions were geared towards minimizing Hoa
Kieu dominance of socio-economic activities.
Immediately after the war, the two Hoa Kieu mass political
groups, the Hanoi Hoa Lien Association and the General Associa-
tion of Overseas Chinese in Vietnam, ceased to exist. As a result,
the Hoa Kieu were disenfranchised from Chinese governmental in-
fluence that had previously been emitted from the People’s Repub-
lic of China Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission directly to the
Hoa Kieu mass political parties. In the north, the Guomindang
party of China communicated directives to Hoa Kieu political par-
ties by means of the Chinese embassy in Hanoi. Meanwhile, the
Chinese Communist Party exercised its influence in the south.
Since 1970, the DRV had encouraged the Hoa Kieu to become
Vietnamese citizens, but the Hoa Kieu were hesitant to do so for
fear of losing the right to return to China, and also to avoid the
prospect of the draft since Hoa Kieu could not be drafted in Viet-
nam or China.63 In conjunction with the SRV’s 1976-1980 five-year
plan, the Hoa Kieu were increasingly pressured to leave the country
or abide by new measures of economic reform. In 1976, Chinese
schools in Vietnam were given Vietnamese names and the Chinese
language was no longer to be taught in provincial schools. Addi-
tionally, Hoa Kieu students were oftentimes discriminated against
when it came to university admissions.64
According to the 1976-1980 five-year plan, the Socialist Repub-
lic of Vietnam had committed to centralizing the economy by
means of taking over the commercial and banking sectors in partic-
61. Ronald J. Cima, Vietnam: A Country Study, Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1981, pp. 93, 102.
62. E. S. Ungar, “The Struggle Over the Chinese Community in Vietnam, 1946-
1986,” Pacific Affairs, 60:4 (1987), p. 598.
63. Charles Benoit, “Vietnam’s Boat People,” in David W. P. Elliott, ed., The Third
Indochina Conflict, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981, p. 144.
64. CHEN Yiz,. “Yuenan beifang huaqiao lishi yanbian gaikuang (A survey of the
historical changes in the Overseas Chinese of northern Vietnam),” in Guangdong
shengzhengxie wenshi ziliao yenjiu weiyuanhuibian (The Guangdong Provincial Con-
sultative Committee for Research on Historical Materials), Huaqiao cangsang lu (A
record of the vicissitudes of the Overseas Chinese), Guangdong: Guangdong renmin
chubanshe, 1984, p. 127.
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ular, which were mostly Chinese and Hoa Kieu owned. The Hoa
Kieu were given the option of working on the rural agricultural col-
lectives or leaving the country. Even so, Hoa Kieu who desired to
leave were forced to submit an application and pay an evacuation
fee, usually comprised of gold or other precious metals.65
In the north, 265,000 Hoa Kieu crossed the border into China
in 1978, mostly from the Quang Ninh province, where the Hoa Kieu
community ranked second in population behind the Cholon, mak-
ing up 22% of the Quang Ninh population prior to 1978.66 In the
south, Cholon’s Chinese population decreased from 72% to 48.9%
of the total, leaving approximately 96,822 Hoa.67 Mostly due to
their proximity to China, the Hoa Kieu in the north were much
more segregated from Vietnamese culture, where Hoa social struc-
tures were centered on clans. Thus, when clan association heads de-
cided to leave Vietnam, the ancestral ashes of that clan were taken
with them.68 On the other hand, in the south, the loss of Hoa Kieu
was much more damaging to the social and economic fabric, espe-
cially in Ho Chi Minh City where the Hoa Kieu population was
3,419,978 people by 1980.69 In a pivotal shift, the city’s administra-
tion, along with other directives across the southern region, started
to become more concerned with improving relations between the
Vietnamese and the remaining Chinese population.70
A major economic and demographic shift was implemented
which aimed to reduce Chinese influence on the political economy
in Vietnam. In addition to small businesses, the ethnic Chinese con-
trolled the scrap metal, cinnamon, petrol, oil, and other heavy in-
dustrial businesses. Without the United States military personnel
present, who consumed approximately 30% of products and ser-
vices in urban areas of southern Vietnam, it was predicted that
small business and urban activity would slow considerably. Thus,
the SRV’s decision to transition from an industrial to agricultural
economy was considered to be both politically and economically
prudent.
65. Pao-Min CHANG, “The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute Over the Ethnic Chinese,”
China Quarterly, Vol. 90 (1982), pp. 195-196.
66. “The Hoa in Vietnam: Dossier,” Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1978, p. 24.
67. Ungar, “Chinese Community in Vietnam,” supra note 1, p. 611.
68. Ungar, “Chinese Community in Vietnam,” supra note 2, p. 609.
69. Alain Monnier, “Donnees recentes sur la population du Vietnam,” Population.
Paris: no. 36.
70. Ungar, “Chinese Community in Vietnam,” supra note 3, p. 611.
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The 1976-1980 five-year plan set forth other major socio-eco-
nomic initiatives. New Economic Areas were established on previ-
ously undeveloped land where heavy industry was generally
thwarted in favor of lighter production facilities such as food
processing and textiles. The agricultural and industrial sectors were
to be intertwined into a single operational system under central
control by the government.
In May 1978, Hanoi introduced a new currency for the entire
country, which replaced the different currencies of the two zones,
north and south. Meanwhile, citizens’ cash reserves above specified
legal limits were frozen or confiscated.71 The harsh form of social-
ism was the government’s attempt to level a playing field that had
been imbalanced for so many years, while at the same time looking
for a way to most efficiently recover from decades of calamitous
war.
In addition to Vietnam’s production economy, foreign aid be-
came a core component of economic stability. Until 1977, China
had contributed about $300 million a year in economic aid to Viet-
nam.72 The following year, in May 1978, China withdrew aid from
seventy-two projects in Vietnam.73 On July 3, 1978, China cut off its
economic aid to Vietnam. In response, on June 28, 1978, Vietnam
joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON),74 and the Council pledged a Comprehensive Pro-
gram of Socialist Economic Integration similar to what had been
done in Mongolia and Cuba. Shortly after, on November 3, 1978, a
Vietnamese delegation went to Moscow and signed the Friendship
and Cooperation Treaty, which carried a twenty-five year validity
period.
The Treaty solidified economic and military ties between Viet-
nam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Long-term mea-
sures towards developing critical sectors of the economy such as
science and technology, as well as knowledge and experiential re-
sources, such as the sharing of administrative and management
techniques, were guaranteed in the alliance. For example, in 1979,
Soviet-assisted enterprises generated 25% of the electrical output,
89% of the extracted coal, 100% of the output of tin, sulfuric acid,
71. Nhan Tri VO, Vietnam’s Economic Policy Since 1975, Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1990, p. 90.
72. IBID, p. 98.
73. IBID, p. 98.
74. Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry, Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press, pp. 191-192.
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apatite, superphosphate, and 61% of metal cutting machines.75 In
addition, 50,000 hectares were dedicated to the production of natu-
ral rubber in the province of Song Be, where the development of
facilities and infrastructure was achieved using Soviet Assistance.76
Not long after signing the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty,
the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia on December 25, 1978, in retali-
ation for the ethnic cleansing of Vietnamese that had taken place in
Cambodia. The Soviet Union provided military equipment to Viet-
nam,77 which facilitated the deployment of 140,000 troops in Cam-
bodia and 50,000 troops in Laos before large-scale withdrawal
began in 1988.78 Vietnam’s total active force was estimated to be
1.26 million at the time.
The Chinese, who backed the Khmer Rouge ruling party, even-
tually sought recourse in February 1979, causing an estimated $1
billion in destruction of several northern Vietnamese provinces.79
With the Soviet Union’s support of Vietnam, further conflict would
have meant a war of major powers, something that neither the So-
viet Union, China, nor Vietnam were anxious to engage in, given
the intense conflict of recent years.
Foreign aid subsidized a large portion of industrial activities in
Vietnam while the central government invested its own resources
predominately in agricultural activities, or the supply of inputs that
supported agriculture such as energy, and the construction of infra-
structure for the transport of equipment, raw materials, and fin-
ished products. Vietnam’s state sector, which controlled agriculture
but only had a partial interest in much of the heavy industry pro-
duction, was operating at only 30 to 50% of capacity.
By 1980, the average scale of agricultural cooperatives, in
terms of households employed and acreage farmed, had more than
doubled as compared to 1975, although per-capita food output in
the North decreased from 248 kilograms in 1976 to 215 kilograms in
1980, the lowest level of production documented in Vietnam’s his-
75. Tri VO, Vietnam’s Economic Policy Since 1975, supra note 1, p. 99.
76. Tri VO, Vietnam’s Economic Policy Since 1975, supra note 2, p. 100.
77. Douglas Pike, PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam, London: Brassey’s, 1986; Greg
Lockart. Nation in Arms: The Origins of the People’s Army of Vietnam, Sydney: Asian
Studies Association of Australia.
78. David R. Jones. Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual: 1987-1988, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, Gulf Breeze, FL, 1989, pp. 175-176.
79. NGUYEN Xuan Lai, “Economic Development 1976-1985,” Vietnamese Studies,
71 (1983), p. 33.
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tory.80 From 1976-1980, Vietnam had to import 5.6 million tons of
food, despite agriculture accounting for approximately 50% of the
GDP.81 Rainfall averaged approximately 20 centimeters per year
instead of the 40 or more centimeters per year needed for a
stronger harvest,82 was likely a contributing factor to the insuffi-
ciencies of collective farming.
Total output of principal industrial products such as coal, ce-
ment, steel, cloth, chemical fertilizers, and paper also decreased
from 1976-1980, from 5.7 million tons to 5.2 million tons, 743.7
thousand tons to 636.6 thousand tons, 63.8 thousand tons to 63.5
thousand tons, 218 million meters to 174.4 million meters, 434.8
thousand tons to 361.7 thousand tons, and 75 thousand tons to 48.3
thousand tons, respectively. Electricity output went from 3.06 bil-
lion kilowatts to 3.65 billion kilowatts over the five-year period be-
coming one of the few industrial products to increase.83
Economic dependency on agriculture during the post-war pe-
riod from 1975-1980 was widely viewed as a failed initiative, and a
transitional economic model was implemented.84 Expressions such
as “those who work outside eat outside” (lam ngoai an ngoai), de-
scribed the economic sentiment of poor farmers. Another common
phrase was “the outside foot is longer than the inside foot” (chan
ngoai dai hon chan trong), alluding to the notion that external mar-
kets would assign higher values to products that were being pro-
duced and consumed within a centrally controlled economy.85
From 1981-1985, a third five-year plan was enacted, which en-
tailed a gradual move toward market systems. During the fourth
80. PHAM Xuan Nam, Be Viet DANG, and Geoffrey B. Hainsworth, “Rural De-
velopment in Viet Nam: The Search For Sustainable Livelihoods,” in Peter Boothroyd
and PHAM Xuan Nam, eds., Socioeconomic Renovation in Viet Nam: The Origin,
Evolution, and Impact of Doi Moi. International Development Research Center, 2000,
p. 13.
81. PHAM Xuan Nam, Be Viet DANG, and Geoffrey B. Hainsworth, “Rural De-
velopment in Viet Nam: The Search For Sustainable Livelihoods,” in Peter Boothroyd
and PHAM Xuan Nam, eds., Socioeconomic Renovation in Viet Nam: The Origin,
Evolution, and Impact of Doi Moi. International Development Research Center, 2000,
p. 14.
82. Netherlands Climate Assistance Programme, Climate change and climate varia-
bility in Vietnam and Thua Thien Hue province: Historical trends and future projec-
tions, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ Directorate General for International
Cooperation, Hanoi, April 2008, pp. 62-63.
83. Nien Giam Thong Ke 1982. (Statistical Yearbook 1982), pp. 187-189; Vietnam
Courier, January 1977, Hanoi: Tong cuc Thong ke, 1982, pp. 6-7.
84. Fforde and Vylder, From Plan to Market, supra note 2, p. 59.
85. Fforde and Vylder, From Plan to Market, supra note 3, pp. 3, 23.
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convocation in September 1979 for the Sixth Plenum of the Viet-
nam Communist Party Central Committee, the decision was made
to recognize an economy that consisted of multiple sectors: state,
collective, and individual entities. Additionally, Instruction 100 was
initiated on January 13, 1981, which made contracts allowable in
order to promote free circulation and exchange of goods.86
For the first time, the government allowed state-owned enter-
prises to procure raw materials partially using open and interna-
tional markets. A three part plan production system was put into
place. Under plan A, a state enterprise uses materials for inputs
that were supplied by the state in order to meet the state’s produc-
tion target. Of the profit, 50% was kept by the enterprise and 50%
was paid to the state.87 With plan B, the enterprise procured materi-
als from sources outside the government supervisory agency but
marketed products at prices that were mutually agreed to with the
state. Of the profit, plan B enterprises kept 60%, paying 40% of the
profits to the state.88 In plan C, an enterprise could sell secondary
items to ‘market’ participants at prices negotiated between the
buyer and seller in which the enterprise was only forced to pay the
government 10% of the profit.89 Assuming enterprises fulfilled pro-
duction obligations to the state then firms could typically engage in
plan B and plan C production systems.90
86. PHAM Xuan Nam, Be Viet DANG, and Geoffrey B. Hainsworth, (2000) “Ru-
ral Development in Viet Nam: The Search For Sustainable Livelihoods,” in Peter
Boothroyd and PHAM Xuan Nam, eds., Socioeconomic Renovation in Viet Nam: The
Origin, Evolution, and Impact of Doi Moi, International Development Research
Center, 2000, p. 15.
87. Hy V. LUONG, “Postwar Vietnamese Society: An Overview of Transforma-
tional Dynamics,” in Hy V. LUONG, ed., Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transform-
ing Society, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p. 9.
88. Hy V. LUONG, “Postwar Vietnamese Society: An Overview of Transforma-
tional Dynamics,” in Hy V. LUONG, ed., Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transform-
ing Society, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p. 9.
89. Hy V. LUONG, “Postwar Vietnamese Society: An Overview of Transforma-
tional Dynamics,” in Hy V. LUONG, ed., Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transform-
ing Society, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p. 9.
90. Hy Van LUONG, “The Political Economy of Vietnamese Reforms: A Micro-
scopic Perspective from Two Ceramics Manufacturing Centers,” in William Turley and
Mark Selden, eds., Reinventing Vietnamese Socialism: Doi Moi in Comparative Perspec-
tive, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993, pp. 119-148.
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From 1981-1985, agricultural production increased at an annual
average of 6% and industrial growth was approximately 8%. Annu-
ally, the GDP grew greater than 6% during the period.91 Mean-
while, in southern Vietnam, the number of organized labor teams
and cooperatives increased from 3,732 and 173 in 1980 to 35,853
and 622 from 1980 to 1985.92 At a glance, the 1981-1985 five-year
plan was economically successful. The proportion of the working
population as a percentage of the total population increased from
36.9% in 1979 to 42.8% in 1984, and finally 44.9% in 1989.93 Mean-
while, Vietnam’s population grew over the period from about 49.1
million in 1976 to about 66 million by the late 1980’s.94 However,
annual hyperinflation between 50% and 100% persisted from 1981-
1985. Despite salary increases to compensate for inflationary woes,
the purchasing power of state employees’ salaries decreased by
over 50% during that time.95
IV. ECONOMIC RENOVATION
In December 1986, the Vietnamese Communist Party endorsed
economic renovation, doi moi, at the Sixth Party Congressional
meeting, in an attempt to shift away from the command-and-control
economic model to a market system economy. The positive effects
of efforts made during recent years toward privatization were para-
mount. By 1987, output produced by local industrial enterprises had
doubled since 1980, while output from centrally managed enter-
prises rose only 64%.96 Inflation was reduced from 308% per an-
num in 1988 to 36% in 1990.97 Employment in the state sector
decreased from 3.86 million total employees in 1985 (approximately
91. Tho van TRAN, Kinh te Viet Nam 1955-2000 (Vietnamese Economy 1955-2000),
Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Thong ke, 2000, p. 293.
92. CHU van Lam, Hop tac hoa nong nghiep Viet Nam: Lich su-van de-trien vong,
(Agricultural cooperativization in Vietnam: History, problems, and prospects), Hanoi:
Nha xuat ban Khoa hoc Xa hoi, 1992, p. 48; LAM Thanh Liem, Chinh sach cai cach
ruong dat Viet Nam (1954-1994). (Land Reform Policies in Vietnam (1954-1994). Paris:
Nam A., 1995, pp. 136-137.
93. Fforde and Vylder, From Plan to Market, supra note 4, p. 105.
94. Fforde and Vylder, From Plan to Market, supra note 5, p. 80.
95. Van TRAN, Vietnamese Economy 1955-2000, supra note 1, pp. 242, 273.
96. Vietnam, General Statistical Office. Nien giam thong ke 1987 [Statistical Year-
book 1987], Hanoi: Tong cuc Thong ke, 1989.
97. World Bank, Vietnam: Public Sector Management and Private Sector Incentives
Economic Report, Hanoi: The World Bank, 1994, p. 131.
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15% of total labor force) to 2.92 million in 1993 (about 9% of total
labor force).98
The first major reform of doi moi was the Foreign Investment
Law that passed in December 1987, allowing for 100% foreign own-
ership of entities and profit repatriation.99 At the time, there was
very little foreign investment and technology severely lagged be-
hind the advancements of other nations in the region. Furthermore,
visits by Vietnamese nationals to market economies were rare and
there were few foreigners from market economies working in Viet-
nam.100 The Law also provided various tax exemptions and conces-
sions for investments in high priority areas such as exports,
consumer goods, technology transfer, and raw materials
processing.101
The impetus for foreign investors was the inexpensive labor in
Vietnam. For example, in 1994, the hourly manufacturing labor cost
in Vietnam was $.14 per hour, assuming a 48-hour week, much
cheaper than other newly industrialized countries such as Taiwan,
Singapore, South Korea, and Malaysia where labor costs were ap-
proaching $5.00 per hour.102 Between 1988 and 1996, projects
funded by foreign investment increased in proportion from 0% to
27% of the total gross value of industrial output in Vietnam.103
By 1993, 57% of the investment capital was devoted to Ho Chi
Minh City and its adjacent provinces; another 30% went to Hanoi
and Haiphong.104 Subsequently, wealth inequality between urban
and rural areas was exacerbated. In 1992, the Northern Highlands
population made up 17.3% of Vietnam’s total population but the
GDP of this region was only 12.7% of the total, as compared to the
98. Vietnam, General Statistical Office. Niem giam thong ke 1994 [Statistical Year-
book 1994], Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Thong ke.
99. Melanie Beresford, “Economic Transition, Uneven Development, and the Im-
pact of Reform on Regional Inequality,” in Hy V. LUONG, ed., Postwar Vietnan: Dy-
namics of a Transforming Society. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p. 62.
100. Raymond Mallon, “Vietnam: Image and Reality,” in John Heath, ed., Revitalis-
ing Socialist Enterprise, London: Routledge, 1993.
101. Melanie Beresford, “Economic Transition, Uneven Development, and the Im-
pact of Reform on Regional Inequality,” in Hy V. LUONG, ed., Postwar Vietnan: Dy-
namics of a Transforming Society, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p. 62.
102. TAN, ASEAN Economic Development, supra note 1, p. 205.
103. Vietnam, General Statistical Office. Niem giam thong ke 1997 [Statistical Year-
book 1997], Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Thong ke, 1998.
104. Vietnam General Statistical Office, Niem giam thong ke 1994 [Statistical Year-
book 1994], Hanoi: Nua xuat ban Thong ke, 1995.
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Southeast region where 12.3% of the population generated 27.1%
of GDP.105
The SRV sought to disaggregate from the agricultural sector
that had been disenfranchising rural peasants for generations. In
March 1988, Resolution 10 of the Vietnamese Politburo sought to
decollectivize the agricultural sector. Accordingly, land was distrib-
uted to households for periods of fifteen years, (up to fifty years for
perennial crops), and households were given authority over deci-
sions related to production and investment.106
Agricultural output began to increase precipitously as the mo-
rale of farmers increased drastically due to land rent and the ex-
panded freedoms that farmers began to have in terms of choosing
production methods and other business decision making. Further-
more, the government’s required share of outputs and profits de-
creased considerably. Approximately five years after Resolution 10,
the Land Law of 1993 ensured the farmers’ rights to lease land up
to a period of 75 years, even though private ownership of land was
still forbidden. In early 1994, the General Department of Land Ad-
ministration (GDLA) was established by merging the General De-
partment of Land Management and the National Department of
Surveying and Mapping. The GDLA at the central government
level, the Department of Land Administration (DLA) at the pro-
vincial level, and the Bureau of Land Administration (BLA) at the
district level were land administration bodies dedicated to imple-
menting a cadastral system including land register, cadastral map-
ping, land tenure certificate issuance, and an updated land records
system.107
In 1997, the GDLA signed an agreement with the Sweden In-
ternational Development Agency (SIDA) named the Vietnam-Swe-
den Cooperation Program on Land Administration Reform
(CPLAR), which would be carried out in two phases from 1997 to
105. World Bank, Vietnam: Poverty Assessment and Analysis, Washington, DC:
World Bank, 1995, pp. 160, 165.
106. Melanie Beresford, “Economic Transition, Uneven Development, and the Im-
pact of Reform on Regional Inequality,” in Hy V. LUONG, ed., Postwar Vietnan: Dy-
namics of a Transforming Society, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p. 62.
107. DANG Hung Vo & Gosta Palmkvist, Sweden-Vietnam Cooperation on Land
Administration Reform in Vietnam, Hanoi: General Department of Land Administra-
tion, 2012, p. 3.
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2001 and from 2002 to 2007.108 Major obstacles to the new cadastral
system involved land classification, land assessment, and land valua-
tion. It was difficult to determine how to transfer land holdings
from the control of the central government, where households rent
land from the government, to a land administration system, where
citizens enjoy the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of land own-
ership, thereby plaguing Vietnam’s real estate market with
uncertainty.
Meanwhile, in urban areas that were less influenced by land
reform movements, beginning in 1989, state-owned enterprises and
the military laid-off approximately 1.5 million people, paving the
way for the street-food revolution within the cities. Women took
control of the means of production— including a charcoal burner,
large pot, wooden (later plastic) stools, and began supporting their
families by selling tea, pho noodle soup, bun cha mini kebabs on
noodles, lau stew, and other traditional Vietnamese dishes.109 Other
merchants such as vegetable sellers, clothing shops, pineapple
peelers, barbers, and bicycle repairers also set up shop.110 Previ-
ously, these types of open markets of trade were strictly forbidden.
In sum, an estimated 350,000 small businesses opened up in the pe-
riod from 1987-1992.111
International trade resulted from the development of these ur-
ban market centers. Thousands of automobiles and second-hand
motorcycles arrived in Vietnam each month from Cambodia. A car
in good condition could be bought in Cambodia for $2000-$3000
and sold in Vietnam for $6000-$7000. Second-hand motorcycles
were less lucrative; they were typically bought in Cambodia for
about $200-$300 and sold in Vietnam for $400-$500.112  With the
newly emerging open markets in urban areas, corruption and gov-
ernment disobedience became commonplace. From January to May
1989, the southwestern provinces alone imported an estimated
108. DANG Hung Vo & Gosta Palmkvist, Sweden-Vietnam Cooperation on Land
Administration Reform in Vietnam, Hanoi: General Department of Land Administra-
tion, 2012, pp. 5-6.
109. Hayton, Rising Dragon, supra note 1, p. 51.
110. Hayton, Rising Dragon, supra note 2, p. 51.
111. NGUYEN Chi Vu, In “Murray Hiebert, Red Capitalists: Private Enterprise
Flourishes Despite Hurdles,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 155:7, February 20, 1992,
p. 51.
112. Melanie Beresford and DANG Phong, Economic Transition in Vietnam: Trade
and Aid in the Demise of a Centrally Planned Economy, Cheltenham, United Kingdom:
Edward Elgar, 2000, p. 127.
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15,000 second-hand motorcycles and 300 automobiles from Cambo-
dia without permits.113
Despite the brief conflict between Vietnam and China in 1979,
the two countries officially reestablished trade with each other
shortly thereafter. Vietnamese Foreign Minister NGUYEN Co
Thach stated: “the cannonballs were replaced by apples crossing the
frontier.”114 Trade with China greatly improved Vietnam’s system
of procurement as competition from Chinese producers resulted in
higher quality goods for the Vietnamese peasantry and working
class.115 As a result of the expanded markets, sewing machines, tra-
ditionally known as luxury goods, could be purchased using the in-
come from 2 kilograms of turtles, 5 kilograms of eels, or 10
kilograms of snails or frogs.116
As openness and other measures unfolded, turning Vietnam
into a market economy during the 1981-1985 and 1986-1990 Five-
Year Plans, the purchasing power of the dong was rapidly declining.
For example, the inflation rate was 231.8% in 1987 and 393.8% in
1988.117 Hyperinflation in Vietnam posed a threat of decreasing for-
eign investment interest and reducing the standard of living for re-
sidents. In the first case, foreign investment interest could subside if
production costs in Vietnam rose too high as a result of the hyperin-
flation. Secondly, the people’s standard of living could sharply de-
cline as prices of goods and services increased at a greater rate than
wages and savings.
Several financial initiatives were put into place in order to
tame inflation and support the dynamic, international economy that
had emerged in what was, until recently, an economic sector cen-
tered on agricultural factors of production and output. In 1988, the
mono-tier banking system was split into a two-tier financial system.
Initially, the state bank operated through two specialized institu-
tions: the Bank for Investment and Development and the Bank for
Foreign Trade. Banking reform created a two-tier financial system
113. DANG Phong, Mo cua va van de bao ve san xuat trong nuoc [The open door
and the problem of protecting domestic production], Nhan Dan 22 September, 1989.
114. Beresford and Dang, Demise of a Centrally Planned Economy, supra note 1, p.
131.
115. DANG Phong, “Aspects of Agricultural Economy and Rural Life,” in Benedict
J. Tria Kerkvliet and Doug J. Porter, (eds.), Vietnam’s Rural Transformation, Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1995, p. 175.
116. Beresford and Dang, Demise of a Centrally Planned Economy, supra note 2, p.
139.
117. International Monetary Fund. Economic Review – Vietnam. Washington, DC,
1994.
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consisting of four commercial banks: Bank of Foreign Trade, Viet-
nam Bank for Industry and Trade, Bank for Investment and Devel-
opment of Vietnam, and Bank for Agriculture. Simultaneously,
foreign banks, which had not been allowed since the Chinese-
owned banks existed prior to the establishment of the SRV, were
given the freedom to operate in Vietnam; all banks under the
Vietnamese central authority were nationalized. Shortly thereafter,
government bonds were issued further stimulating industrial
growth. Debt financing as a percentage of GDP increased steadily
from 10% in 1989, to 17% in 1992, and to 27.1% in 1995.118
In addition to debt instruments, the Finance Ministry engaged
in other financial engineering. For example, in June 1992, the Minis-
try of Finance put the Legamex garment factory and six other firms
up for sale; these were the first state-owned enterprises to offer
ownership shares to private investors including foreigners. An addi-
tional nine state-owned companies were offered for sale the same
year. At the time, the 12,000 state-owned companies held 75% of
the nation’s assets, 30% of the labor force, and 86% of bank
credit.119 Despite the state’s goal to promote the household sector
in rural areas and small businesses in the urban centers, the state-
owned industrial sector’s share of the GDP rose from 36% in 1991
to 46% in 1994.120 The SRV was in the midst of adopting a capitalist
system.
The central government had been planning a stock market
since 1991. Mergers and acquisitions between Vietnam’s more than
5,000 state-run enterprises were becoming commonplace and ef-
forts toward government business divestiture and privatization
were thought to be best achieved through capital equity markets.
Finally, on November 28, 1996, the State Securities Commission,
established under Decree 75/CP, listed two companies, Refrigera-
tion Electrical Engineering Joint Stock Corporation (REE) and Sai-
gon Cable and Telecommunication Material Joint Stock Company
(SSC). At first, only stocks and bonds equitized by state-owned en-
terprises and commercial banks would be listed. Fixed maturity
bills, debt certificates, treasury bills issued by the Ministry of Fi-
nance, and medium and long-term bills issued by the government
118. World Bank, 1995. Vietnam – Economic Report on Industrialization and Indus-
trial Policy. Washington, DC.
119. Murray Hiebert, “Economies: Fateful Experiment,” Far Eastern Economic Re-
view, August 20, 1992, p. 50.
120. A. Schwartz, “No Respect: Vietnam’s Private Sector Plays On An Uneven Play-
ing Field,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 6, 1995, p. 68.
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for major public works projects were all floated in transactional
markets.121
In addition to financial stabilization and economic reform to-
ward openness, significant political movement was taking place
such as those in the Than Hoa province during 1989, for example,
where citizen demonstrations were common. In some cases, demon-
strators threw stones into office windows, shouted at bureaucratic
officials, and even took policemen hostage in exchange for liberal-
ized policy concessions.122 The same year, the Club of Former Re-
sistance Fighters (Cau Lac Bo Nhung Nguoi Khang Chien Cu) in
Ho Chi Minh City published a magazine detesting prohibitions
against private media companies. In response, the central govern-
ment blocked the groups’ access to printing presses and mimeo-
graph machines. Finally, in early 1990, the Club’s members were
detained and the leader, Nguyen Ho, was placed under house
arrest.123
The most significant political advancement of doi moi took
place when the Constitution was ratified in 1992. By examining the
SRV’s Constitution, which was built upon those of 1946, 1959, and
1980, and was later amended on December 25, 2001, it officially
became clear to both the Vietnamese and observers abroad that
Vietnam consists of a state grounded in its dynamic economic sys-
tem. For example, Article 16 states:124
The economic policies of the State are to build a strong
country with prosperous life for its people, and aimed at
ever better satisfying the material and spiritual needs of
the people by bringing into full play all productive capaci-
ties, and all the potentials of the various economic sectors
comprising the State, collective, individual, small-holder,
private capitalist, State capitalist, and the economy with
foreign owned capital under different forms; stepping up
121. Cindy Nguyen, “The Vietnamese Stock Market: Viability in Southeast Asia and
Appeal Around the World,” Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law
Review, 21:4 (1999), pp. 613-614.
122. Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, “Authorities and the People: An Analysis of State-
Society Relations in Vietnam,” in Hy V. LUONG, ed., Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a
Transforming Society, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Singapore: Insti-
tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p. 34.
123. Russell Hianh-Khng Heng, “Media in Vietnam and the Structure of its Manage-
ment,” in David Marr, ed., The Mass Media in Vietnam. Canberra, Australia: Depart-
ment of Political and Social Change, Australia National University, 1998, pp. 27-53.
124. Social Republic of Vietnam’s Constitution, Amended December 15, 2001, Arti-
cle 16.
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the construction of the material and technical basis, ex-
panding economic, scientific, and technical cooperation
and exchanges with the international market.
Furthermore, Articles 15 through 29 are dedicated to providing ec-
onomic freedoms that had been absent throughout the state’s his-
tory. In Article 21:125
Individual economic entities, small-holders and the private
capitalist economic sector are allowed to choose their
forms of production and business, have the right to set up
business without any limitations as to their scale of activi-
ties in branches and trades which are beneficial to the
well-being of the nation and its people. The development
of household economy is encouraged.
Economic reforms were not the only mainstay of the Constitu-
tion. Despite Vietnam’s self-declared government classification as
“socialist” and “communist,” the bureaucracy and state enterprise
wholeheartedly declares its commitment to the people of the coun-
try. Article 2 of the Constitution declares: “The State of the Social-
ist Republic of Vietnam is a State of the people, by the people, for
the people. All State power belongs to the people whose founda-
tion is the alliance between the working class and the peasantry and
the intelligentsia.”126 The large wealth disparity among the coun-
try’s populous indicates that the “alliance” between the working
class and intelligentsia is fragmented. To reduce the economic gap
between urban and rural areas, several welfare programs were insti-
tuted in order to address the wealth disparity and to garner support
for the newly constitutionalized state.
The SRV instituted an income transfer process where the cen-
tral government increased the budget share allocation to the North-
ern Highlands region from 7.8% in 1992 to 12.8% in 1998, which
was part of a government program to target Vietnam’s 1,000
poorest communities.127 While the results of the program did not
drastically affect the GDP of the Northern Highlands and Central
125. Social Republic of Vietnam’s Constitution, Amended December 15, 2001, Arti-
cle 21.
126. Social Republic of Vietnam’s Constitution, Amended December 15, 2001, Arti-
cle 2.
127. Hy V. LUONG, “Wealth, Power, and Inequality: Global Market, the State, and
Local Sociocultural Dynamics,” in Hy V. LUONG, ed., Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of
a Transforming Society, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Singapore: In-
stitute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p. 92.
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Highlands regions, the government’s capital investment in infra-
structure helped support other social programs that were being im-
plemented at the time.
State educational and healthcare outlays made by the govern-
ment increased dramatically, 10.9% to 17.4% of public expendi-
tures, and 5.8% to 8.5%, respectively, from 1992 to 1998.128
Knowing that poor communities had limited access to upper secon-
dary and postsecondary education, state investment in education
was consciously directed towards primary education and lower sec-
ondary education. From 1993 to 1998, state subsidies of primary ed-
ucation expenses increased from 45% to 61% and from 34% to
42% for lower secondary education. Over the same period, state
coverage of upper secondary education expenses declined from
40% to 33%. Higher and vocational education subsidies declined
from 71% of user coverage to 46% from 1993 to 1998.129
Despite the welfare programs, the wealth disparity continued
to worsen in 1998 when the Northern Highlands region consisted of
17.2% of Vietnam’s total population, but produced only 11.5% of
the nation’s GDP. Concurrently, the much wealthier southeast re-
gion’s population gradually increased to 13.2% of the nation’s total
population and raised the area’s market value to 31.5% of Viet-
nam’s GDP.130
Overall, the welfare programs can be viewed as successfully re-
ducing the standard of living gap, especially the disparities that
were evident between urban and rural areas. The cumulative wel-
fare programs managed to decrease the proportion of Vietnamese
living in poverty from 58% in 1993 to 37.4% in 1998.131 Meanwhile,
adult literacy drastically increased from 1990-1998, especially in ru-
ral areas. The number of literates nearly tripled in the North Cen-
tral Coast and South Central Coast areas, from 551,414 people in
1990 to 1,400,106 people in 1998 and from 682,385 in 1990 to
1,667,234 people in 1998, respectively. And in the Red River Delta
and north East regions, the number of literates nearly doubled from
128. Vietnam and International Donor Group, Vietnam: Managing Public Resources
Better, 2 Volumes. Hanoi: Vietnam Development Information Center, 2000, pp. 98, 99,
128.
129. Vietnam and International Donor Group, Vietnam: Managing Public Resources
Better, 2 Volumes. Hanoi: Vietnam Development Information Center, 2000, p. 144.
130. World Bank, Vietnam: Poverty Assessment and Analysis. Washington, DC:
World Bank, 1995, pp. 160, 165.
131. Vietnam, Government Statistical Office, in Investment Policy Review of Viet
Nam, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York and Geneva,
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, 2008, p. 4.
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2,520,406 people in 1990 to 3,977,721 in 1998 and from 700,312 peo-
ple in 1990 to 1,650,243 people in 1998, respectively. Even the
highly literate Mekong River Delta, where 4,114,205, or about 90%
of the population were literate in 1990, improved its number of
literates to 4,750,602 people in 1998.132
As the workforce became more educated and the agricultural
sector was de-collectivized, economic transition occurred between
sectors. The agricultural sector’s percentage of GDP decreased
from 46.5% in 1980 to 28% in 1995 while industry’s contribution to
GDP increased from 11.6% to 30%, respectively.133 Furthermore,
the development of skilled and knowledgeable workers enabled a
private service sector to become established, performing services
that were previously completed by the state sector. The agricultural
sector also greatly benefited from the series of reforms that were
taking place. For example, rice production increased substantially
as a result of the economic renovation. Vietnam had gone from a
food shortage where even rice needed to be imported, to the
world’s third largest exporter of rice within four years (1986 to
1990).
The successes of privatization and foreign investment meant
that heavy industry began to flourish. With increased production,
environmental concerns began to loom. Many Vietnamese assimi-
late with traditional culture in which people live in harmony with
nature.134 On the other hand, attempts to reduce high poverty rates
have also led to the belief that a Vietnamese local would rather
look at a power generator than a patch of trees. In any case, with
the help of international support and influence, the negative exter-
nalities of a developing nation were starting to be addressed.
In 1990, the United Nations Development Program, the Inter-
national Union for the Conservation of Nature, and the Swedish
International Development Agency organized a conference in Ha-
noi. From the information and support garnered at the conference,
Vietnamese conference attendees devised a National Program on
the Environment and Sustainable Development: Framework for
Action, and submitted the proposal to the Council of Ministries (to-
132. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
The EFA 2000 Assessment: Country Reports, Vietnam.
133. World Bank, World Development Indicators 1997. Department of Statistics, Bru-
nei Darussalam Statistical Yearbook, 1995.
134. LE Trong Cuc, “Vietnam: Traditional Concepts of Human Relations with the
Environment,” Asian Geographer, 18:1-2 (1999), pp. 67-74.
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day Office of Government).135 In 1991 the National Research Pro-
gram on Environmental Protection was launched and by 1992 the
government accepted the Framework for Action proposal.
The Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment was
created in 1993 and serves to enforce environmental provisions re-
lated to environmental regulatory activities. On January 10, 1994,
the Law on Environmental Protection was formally enacted, which
set forth requirements such as environmental impact assessments of
industrial plants, levying of environmental taxes, establishment of
environmental standards, and related inspections.136 Furthering Vi-
etnam’s environmental sustainability efforts, the National Environ-
mental Agency was established in 1995. The environmental
protections instilled by the SRV are quite extraordinary considering
that only twenty years prior the nation was facing longstanding oc-
cupation. While the government was still combating comparatively
high rates of poverty and low per capita household income, the gov-
ernment was willing to prioritize for the long-term and the viability
of the surrounding region.
Vietnam’s progress as a result of movement towards a market
economy during the 1981-1985 Five-Year Plan and doi moi that fol-
lowed was phenomenal. While emphasis on the central govern-
ment’s state-enterprise apparatus was effectively decreased, the
state’s generation of revenues increased, indicating that the govern-
ment became more efficient while the business private sector was
also flourishing. Additionally, major demographic shifts took place;
since the beginning of the French Indochina war, millions had left
and entered the country.
Vietnam’s global outreach expanded both economically from
doi moi, and geopolitically from the standpoint that many
Vietnamese had so quickly become established in other countries,
further enhancing international trade. Vietnam was truly becoming
a dynamic economy, and in July 1995, Vietnam joined the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Also in 1995, the
135. Michael DiGregorio, A. Terry Rambo, & Masayuki Yanagisawa, “Clean, Green,
and Beautiful: Environment and Development under the Renovation Economy,” in Hy
V. LUONG, ed., Postwar Vietnan: Dynamics of a Transforming Society, Boulder, CO:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p.
194.
136. Michael DiGregorio, A. Terry Rambo, & Masayuki Yanagisawa, “Clean, Green,
and Beautiful: Environment and Development under the Renovation Economy,” in Hy
V. LUONG, ed., Postwar Vietnan: Dynamics of a Transforming Society, Boulder, CO:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003,
p. 195.
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United States lifted its trade embargo with Vietnam and officially
recognized the sovereign country. Trade between the United States
and Vietnam developed quickly as some Unites States producers
shifted business to Vietnam from other more expensive Asian coun-
tries. Simultaneously, Vietnam submitted an application to the
World Trade Organization (WTO).
Global confidence in the region subsided when the Asian Cur-
rency Crisis of 1997 hit. Foreign investment in Vietnam decreased
from approximately $3 billion to $1.5 billion from 1997 to 1998 and
export growth fell by 50%, despite the fact that Vietnam was rela-
tively unaffected by the crisis.137 Vietnam’s conservative financial
policies, in which the use of aggressive financial and monetary poli-
cies were limited, kept Vietnam’s currency and monetary system
largely independent from surrounding nations in the region who
were severely impacted. Nonetheless, Vietnam was forced to de-
value its currency three times from 1997-1998, in response to the
shortage of United States dollars in the country that served as a
medium of exchange in the import and export businesses.
V. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
On December 26, 1997, President TRAN Duc Luong signed
Law No. 01/1997/QH10, establishing the State Bank of Vietnam.
The functions of the State Bank are to act as the central bank, the
bank of credit institutions, control circulation of currency, and for-
mulate monetary policy.138 In addition, according to Article 5, Du-
ties and powers of the State Bank, Section 1.a. stipulates “The State
Bank shall have the following duties and powers: To be involved in
developing strategy and planning for the socio-economic develop-
ment of the State.”139
The period, which spanned through the 1990’s, demonstrated
quantitative and productive growth in Vietnam. The Socio-Eco-
nomic Development Strategy Plan of 1991-2000 was successful in
achieving rapid economic growth. For example, the total value of
Vietnamese exports increased from $2.4 billion in 1990 to $11.5 bil-
lion in 1999. Meanwhile, the total value of imports also increased
substantially, from $2.75 billion in 1990 to $11.74 billion in 1999.140
137. Tan, ASEAN Economic Development, supra note 2, p. 206.
138. Law No. 01/1997/QH10 on State Bank of Vietnam, Articles 1-3.
139. Law No. 01/1997/QH10 on State Bank of Vietnam, Article 5, Section 1.a.
140. General Statistics Office, Vietnam. Total values of exports and imports, 1990-
2001, in Brian Van Arkadie & Raymond Mallon, eds., Vietnam: A Transition Tiger?
Asia Pacific Press at The Australian National University, p. 271.
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Not only had the market value of Vietnam’s international economic
activity increased nearly five-fold during the 1990’s, but Vietnam’s
trading activity remained in balance, with exports equaling imports.
Furthermore, Vietnam;s GDP increased tremendously in all
three major economic sectors. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing’s
contribution to the GDP increased from 12 VND billion in 1990 to
about 61 VND billion in 1999 while industry and construction’s con-
tribution to the GDP increased from 6.6 VND billion to 88 VND
billion and the services industry increased from 10.8 VND billion to
107.3 VND billion from 1990 to 1999, in constant Vietnamese Dong
prices.141 After ten years of the Socio-Economic Strategy of 1991-
2000, which entailed the Five-Year Plans of 1991-1995 and 1996-
2000, Vietnam’s GDP had more than doubled (2.07 times), and do-
mestic savings in 2000 accounted for 27% of the GDP.142 Mean-
while, publicly guaranteed debt issued by the Government of
Vietnam was only 32.7% of GDP in 2000, well below the 50%
threshold.143 Households’ ability to save money while providing
levels of consumption that would keep the economy expanding is
an indicator of Vietnam’s organic growth and the success of doi
moi.
There were several deficiencies that remained after the 1991-
2000 Socio-Economic Strategy expired. From an economic stand-
point, efficiency and competitiveness were still considered by the
government to be inadequate. Foreign direct investments had only
slowly recovered after the Asian Currency Crisis. Additionally, the
investment and business environment was laden with obstacles.
From a social standpoint, the quality of training and education was
poor. There were also several unsettled viewpoint issues such as the
role of the state and the market, and administrative reforms aimed
at raising the capacity of the public sector as well as reducing
corruption.144
141. General Statistics Office, Vietnam. Total values of exports and imports, 1990-
2001, in Brian Van Arkadie & Raymond Mallon, eds., Vietnam: A Transition Tiger?
Asia Pacific Press at The Australian National University, p. 268.
142. Worldbank, Strategy for Socio-Economic Development 2001-2010, Presented by
the Central Committee, Eighth Tenure, to the Ninth National Congress http:site
resources.worldbank.org/intvietnam/resources/socio_economic_dev.pdf
143. International Monetary Fund, Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation-
Debt Sustainability Analysis, Approved by Masahiko TAKEDA and Dhaneshwar
Ghura (IMF) and Sudhir Shetty and Jeffrey Lewis (IDA). April 27, 2012, p. 3.
144. Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Government Web Portal, Strategy for Socio-Eco-
nomic Development 2001-2010, Evaluation of the Implementation of the 1991-2000
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After a long period of accelerated economic growth and reno-
vation under doi moi, the state’s focus shifted from quantitative
growth to achieving quality of development. The Socio-Economic
Development Strategy Plan for 2001-2010 entailed five specific
goals. First, to double the GDP while having exports increase at
more than double the rate of GDP growth and additionally, to
make a concerted effort to increase the domestic savings rates and
foreign exchange reserves while keeping budget deficits and infla-
tion within safe limits. Secondly, to reduce poverty, reduce unem-
ployment in urban areas to below 5%, increase trained labor to
40% of the workforce, and increase the average life expectancy to
71 years of age. Third, improve the scientific and technological ca-
pacities of the collective nation, placing an emphasis on modern
technologies such as information, biotechnology, new materials,
and automation over the next decade. Fourth, further develop in-
frastructure and communication systems. Finally, the plan sought to
renew and redevelop state and private sectors.145 Underlying the
five specific goals of the 2001-2010 Socio-Economic Strategy Devel-
opment Plan were the overall goals of becoming a modern-oriented
industrialized country by 2020, development of human resources
and social capital, and raising the status of the country in the inter-
national arena.146
The Socio-Economic Strategy Development Plan of 2001-2010
continued the implementation of central planning, this time focus-
ing on qualitative areas such as human resources in addition to
solely quantitative considerations involving production and total
output. For example, beginning in 2004, human resource develop-
ment programs were implemented that sought to provide linkage
between the new emphasis on education and the productive sector,
which dominated the socio-economic development plan of 1991-
2000. More specifically, Vietnam dedicated the equivalent of $20.7
million to train gifted students in the areas of management, technol-
ogy, and business in conjunction with an additional scholarship pro-
Socio-Economic Strategy http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/Engl. ish/strate-
gies/strategiesdetails?categoryid=29&articleid=3065. July 11, 2006.
145. Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Government Web Portal, Strategy for Socio-Eco-
nomic Development 2001-2010, Strategic Goals http://www.chinhphu.vn/ portal/page/
portal/English/strategies/strategiesdetails?categoryid =29&articleid=3065. July 11, 2006.
146. Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Government Web Portal, Strategy for Socio-Eco-
nomic Development 2001-2010. Strategic Goals http://www.chinhphu.vn/ portal/page/
portal/English/strategies/strategiesdetails?categoryid =29&articleid=3065. July 11, 2006.
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gram valued at approximately $40 million.147 Top graduates aged
22-30 years old who studied business management, economics, or
law were eligible to enroll in postgraduate programs and would be
placed as middle managers upon entering the workforce.148
In addition, the state government encouraged universities, vo-
cational schools, and companies to invest in education and training
through special tax reductions and fiscal incentives.149 In 2000,
about 15% of the state budget was allocated to education, as com-
pared to 8% in 1990.150 Also, education institutions set up with ei-
ther 100% foreign-owned capital or as joint ventures with
Vietnamese investors were encouraged. As a result of the emphasis
on education, the number of higher educated students increased
from 1.18% of the total population in 2000 to 1.69% of the total by
2005,151 a substantial 30% increase over the period.
Gearing education and training programs towards producing
managerial and vocational talent aligned with the countless empha-
ses during the 1980’s and 1990’s of minimizing economic reliance on
the agricultural sector in favor of industry and manufacturing. Re-
gardless, Vietnam’s agricultural output continues to be a key driver
of growth and prosperity. Since 2000, Vietnam has been the world’s
second largest producer of coffee,152 and the single largest exporter
of the Robusta variety, due to the approximately 500,000 hectares
of Robusta coffee trees that were planted in the previous decade.153
While some Arabica coffee is about 1-2% of total coffee produc-
tion, the fungus Hemileia vastatrix, which causes coffee rust, re-
147. Ames Gross and Rachel Weintraub, Vietnam Human Resources Update, Wis-
consin: Pacific Bridge, 2005.
148. NGUYEN Ngoc Thang & TRUONG Quang, “International Briefing 18: Train-
ing and Development in Vietnam,” International Journal of Training and Development,
11:2 (2007), p.142.
149. Nguyen and Truong, “Training and Development in Vietnam,” supra note 1,
p.141.
150. Ministry of Education and Training, The Vietnam Educational System, 2003
http://edu.net.vn/data/doc/hethonggiaoduc.
151. General Office of Statistics, Education, Health, Culture, and Living Standards
Report, Hanoi: Statistics House, 2005.
152. Doutriaux, Geisler, and Shively, “Competing for Coffee in the Central High-
lands of Vietnam,” supra note 1, p. 528.
153. Pasquale Giungato, Elvira Nardone, and Luigi Notarnicola, “Environmental
and Socio-Economic Effects of Intensive Agriculture: The Vietnam Case,” Journal of
Commodity Science, Technology, and Quality, 47:I-IV (2008), p. 136.
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duced Arabica output in southern Vietnam from 64.5% of the total
coffee crop yield only 1.7% of the total in 1957.154
Coffee production is mostly concentrated in the Dak Lak prov-
ince of the highlands region, where the tropical climate is also
favorable to the production of rubber, black pepper, fruit trees, co-
coa, hybrid maize, beans, and cotton. It is Dak Lak’s thick basalt
soil and two growing seasons that are particularly favorable to
Robusta coffee.155 The 500 to 700 meter altitude in the Central
Highlands also allows for high temperature differentials between
day and night, which is highly conducive to coffee production.156
Accordingly, the 2001-2010 Socio-Economic Strategy Development
Plan included an initiative to relocate up to 260,000 people into the
coffee-producing province of Dak Lak in order to capitalize on the
booming coffee export business.157
The growth of coffee production in the highlands region of
western Vietnam, which accounted for 60% of coffee production in
Vietnam, resulted in social conflict. The population of ethnic major-
ity Vietnamese, the Kinh, who moved to the highlands from coastal
zones, now surpassed the population of the Ede, Vietnamese indig-
enous to the highlands.158 Since 1975, it is estimated that between
four and five million people migrated to the Central Highlands.
Population density exploded in the region from three people per
square kilometer in 1940 to seventy-seven people per square kilo-
meter in 1997.159 In 2002, the population growth rate of the Dak
Lak province was 6.18% per annum, the highest in Vietnam.160
Rapid population and coffee production growth tended to benefit
the Kinh at the expense of the Ede. First of all, the accelerated pro-
duction systems implemented replaced fallowing with new ap-
154. Roger Teulieries, La Culture du Cafeier au Sud Vietnam, Bordeaux, France,
1961, p. 86.
155. Doutriaux, Geisler, and Shively, “Competing for Coffee in the Central High-
lands of Vietnam,” supra note 2, p. 543.
156. DO T. Nhan, Orientations of Vietnam Coffee Industry, Speech given at the
International Coffee Conference, London, May 17-19, 2001.
157. Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network (AITPN), Persecution of Indige-
nous Hill Peoples of Vietnam, Briefing Paper, Indigenous Issues- 01, New Delhi:
AITPN.
158. Doutriaux, Geisler, and Shively, “Competing for Coffee in the Central High-
lands of Vietnam,” supra note 3, p. 529.
159. Frederic Fortunel, Le Cafe´ au Vietnam: de la Colonisation a l’Essor d’un Grand
Producteur Mondial, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000.
160. Oxfam, The Impact of the Global Coffee Trade on Dak Lak Province, Vietnam:
Analysis and Policy Recommendations, Oxfam Great Britain, Oxfam Hong Kong: In-
formation Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development, 2002.
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proaches to soil fertility that required capital, chemical inputs, or
additional labor. These requirements created ecological side effects
for communities, such as the Ede, who depended on native
agroforestry in times of drought or other natural calamity.161 The
new coffee production methods resulted in severe bio-depletion
and forest clearing that negatively affected the native Ede who were
accustomed to yielding non-coffee based benefits of the natural
habitat.
Meanwhile, land laws were instituted that disadvantaged the
Ede’s longhouse extended family living household. “Red Books”
were issued to family households as certificates of land ownership,
but the government-stipulated allocation of land was not adjusted
to account for the extended family households of the Ede popula-
tion. An arbitrary amount of land was granted to each Ede long-
house without considering how many nuclear families were
contained within each household.162
Food shortages resulted as Ede longhouses found it increas-
ingly difficult to produce profits that could sustain large extended
households. The competition for coffee space crowded out rice cul-
tivation, hunting, and gathering; thus food had to be purchased
rather than grown, and longhouses with minimal profits could not
feed extended families. Subsequently, declining coffee prices from
1999 to 2001 resulted in substantial poverty amongst coffee growing
communities. In 1999 farmers could sell coffee for $1.40 per kilo as
opposed to around 40 cents by 2001. The coffee farmers’ response
to decreasing production prices varied amongst the Ede and the
Kinh ethnic groups. The Kinh migrants were more likely to change
crops, borrow capital, or seek off-farm employment than the Ede,
reflecting the Ede’s low agricultural capacity and lack of opportu-
nity within economic networks that were dominated by the Kinh.163
The coffee rush in Vietnam also had other negative externali-
ties. In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, nominal prices of fertilizer
dropped by about 50% as Vietnam opened its doors to the global
economy. Domestically produced organic fertilizers were aban-
doned for the much less expensive imported chemical fertilizers,
161. Peter Vandergeest, “Land of Some Tillers: Development-Induced Displacement
in Laos,” International Social Science Journal, 55 (2003), pp. 47-56.
162. Doutriaux, Geisler, and Shively, “Competing for Coffee in the Central High-
lands of Vietnam,” supra note 4, p. 539.
163. DANG Thanh Ha & Gerald Shively, “Coffee Boom, Coffee Bust and Small-
holder Response in Vietnam’s Central Highlands,” Review of Development Economics,
12:2 (2008), pp. 312-326.
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contributing to environmental degradation.164 In addition to agri-
cultural byproducts, pollution from heavy industry continues to be
an ongoing threat to sustainable socio-economic development in
Vietnam. From 1991 to 2003 industry increased from 23.8% of the
GDP to 39.9% and manufacturing increased from 13.1% to
20.7%.165
Just as management of social issues such as equality and equity
gradually came to be the focus of the coffee trade in Vietnam,
rather than output considerations that had been the main concern
since doi moi, the Socio-Economic Development Plan of 2001-2010
coincided with formulation of the National Strategy for Environ-
mental Protection: 2001-2010. At the forefront of the national envi-
ronmental strategy was the sustainability of coastal zones that
produce substantial economic activity.
The port cities of Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang are ship-
ping epicenters of the Southeast Asia region and the beach resorts
of Da Nang and Nha Trang are among the most popular tourist
destinations. The tourism industry has shown dramatic growth. In
1990, about 250,000 foreign tourists travelled to Vietnam, increasing
to 1.716 million by 1997.166 Additionally, domestic tourism surged
dramatically, from 2.7 million people in 1993 to 9 million in 1999.
Meanwhile, 80% of the tourists travel to coastal areas.167 In 2011
and 2012, there were 6.01 million and 6.85 million international
visitors.168
Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) plans were put
into place to manage the socio-economic issues related to the grow-
ing industry, tourism, and population of the 3,440 kilometers of
coastline that extends from the Chinese border in the north to
Cambodia in the south along the Gulf of Thailand. From September
2000 through August 2003, the ICZM Project was managed by the
164. Giungato, Nardone, and Notarnicola, “Environmental and Socio-Economic Ef-
fects of Agriculture in Vietnam,” supra note 1, p. 138.
165. VO Tri Thanh, “Economic Reforms in Vietnam: What Lessons can be Learnt?”
in Janos Kornai and Yingyi QIAN, eds., Market and Socialism: In the Light of the Ex-
periences of China and Vietnam, 2009, p. 197.
166. VO Si Tuan, Coastal and Marine Conservation in Vietnam, in Proceedings of the
European-Asia Workshop on investigation and management of Mediterranean and
South China Sea Coastal Zone, Hong Kong, November 9-11, 1998, pp. 37-44.
167. Nagothu Udaya Sekhar, “Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Vietnam:
Present Potentials and Future Challenges,” Ocean & Coastal Management, 48 (2005), p.
817.
168. Government of Vietnam, Ministry of Culture, Sport, & Tourism. International
Visitors.
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Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and coordinated
via the Vietnam Environmental Protection Agency (VEPA), cre-
ated in 1993.
The pilot project was a partnership with The Netherlands that
provided help in the form of technical assistance and knowhow. The
Netherlands has long been known for its success in environmental
policy, especially when it comes to opening communication chan-
nels for deliberation between stakeholders and interest groups to
take place. The Dutch New Environmental Policy Plans, first
adopted in 1989, created a multiple time-frame planning process
that stressed local, regional, fluvial, continental, and global problem
solving while stressing consultation and cooperation with govern-
ment ministries at all levels, industry groups, and other interested
stakeholders.169
The ICZM aimed to instill a similar approach in Vietnam. By
means of the Strategy Action Plan (SAPICZM), forums were cre-
ated to provide interaction between ministries and provincial au-
thorities through workshops, seminars, scientific meetings, and
other consultative activities. Project offices were set up at the pilot
study locations; the first was in Danang city.170 Although it is still
early to evaluate the success of the ICZM initiative, the program
stimulated environmental interest among national leaders and
helped spur the development of management frameworks to guide
future processes.171
Several problematic environmental areas remain as threats to
the current budgetary and political scene in Vietnam. Just north of
Danang, the Tam Giang-Cau Hai (TGCH) lagoon complex is lo-
cated along the coast of the Thua Thien Hue (TTH) province in
Vietnam. The TGCH lagoon is 219.18 square kilometers and is the
largest lagoon system in Southeast Asia. There are several critical
issues related to the sustainability of the lagoon system and the
commerce inherent to it. And, just as economically driven migra-
tion resulted in conflicts between the Hoa and the state, and the
Ede and the Kinh, economic consequences from environmental
damage to lagoon systems and delta watersheds could yield similar
results.
169. Daniel J. Fiorino, The New Environmental Regulation, Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, 2006, p. 180.
170. Sekhar, “Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Vietnam,” supra note 1, p.
822.
171. Sekhar, “Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Vietnam,” supra note 2, p.
822.
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In the TGCH lagoon alone, aquaculture, capture fisheries, ag-
ricultural production, and sea-grass collection yielded a total bene-
fit to local populations of 35.4 billion dong, 23.9 billion dong, 19.1
billion dong, and 3.1 billion dong, respectively, for the year 2005.172
Other mineral rich environmental areas have been found to con-
tribute a similarly significant economic impact. For example, the
Can Gio mangrove forest in Ho Chi Minh City has a total use value
of about 95 billion VND per annum.173 In the Camau province of
the Mekong River Delta, wetlands areas supporting fisheries,
aquaculture, timber, wood for fuel, and medical plants are esti-
mated to generate 7.5 million dong/hectare per annum.174
The same economic benefits that are reaped from the wetlands
and coastlands natural resource areas continue to threaten the via-
bility of these precious domains. Over the past 50 years, about 70%
of the mangrove forests in Vietnam have been destroyed (from
408,500 hectares in 1943 reduced to 110,700 hectares in 2000).175
There is still a substantial amount of land to be protected; the vast
majority of the Mekong River Delta can be classified as wetlands,
for example. The problems involve industrial developments and re-
lated infrastructure systems that have been planned poorly or were
not designed to be ecofriendly.
For instance, the Tram Chim National Park is composed of
9,000 hectares of wetlands in the Dong Thap province and is en-
closed by 53 kilometers of dykes and canals. The dyke and canal
system was built in 1985 to restore the wetland ecological systems
destroyed during the Second Indochina War. Then in 2001, the
dykes were raised to four meters above ground level in order to
improve tourist and maintenance accessibility. However, the higher
dykes have impeded water exchange resulting in dwindled fish mi-
172. TRAN Huu Tuan, MAI Van Xuan, DO Nam, and Stale Navrud, “Valuing Di-
rect Use Values of Wetlands: A Case Study of Tam Giang-Cau Hai Lagoon Wetland in
Vietnam,” Ocean & Coastal Management, 52 (2009), p. 109.
173. VEPA/IUCN, Economic Valuation of Can Gio Mangrove Forest in Ho Chi
Minh City, Project funded by the Netherlands, carried out by Vietnam Environmental
Protection Agency and International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2000.
174. Thang Nam DO & Jeff Bennett, An Economic Valuation of Wetlands in Viet-
nam’s Mekong Delta: A Case Study of Direct Use Values in Camau Province, Asia
Pacific School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, Occa-
sional Paper No. 8, June, 2005. ISSN 1447-6975.
175. Vietnam Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Cac khia canh ve
dieu kien tu nhien dat ngap nuoc o Vietnam (Issues of Natural Conditions of wetlands in
Vietnam), Hanoi: 2002, p. 32.
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gration throughout the tributaries of the Mekong River Delta.176 In
response to irrigation and watershed issues, the central government
issued Decision 186 in 2006, stating that the hydrology of special
forests or wetlands must be managed according to the needs of re-
spective ecosystems.177
In other cases, commercial activities present direct tradeoff
scenarios between economic output and conservation. The leading
economic activities causing wetland degradation are increases in
aquaculture, notably shrimp farming, conversion of mangroves to
rice fields, fuel wood collection and building construction.178 Air
pollution is also becoming an issue with the increase in automobiles
that have been introduced into the economy in place of bicycles.
The production of Vietnam’s two cash crops, rice and coffee,
present serious obstacles to the nation’s socio-economic viability
due to the environmental degradation caused by their cultivation.
Significant efforts have been made by the government to address
environmental concerns. A dramatic change in citizens’ perceptions
has also taken place— which is a beginning. In 2007, households in
Hanoi were willing to contribute the dong equivalent of $2.50 per
household in Hanoi and $.90 per household in Ho Chi Minh City in
order to make needed wetlands improvement in the Mekong River
Delta.179 The protection efforts face numerous obstacles, not all of
which are related to industrial expansion. The topography of Viet-
nam is 80% hills and mountains, draining into low lying, highly
populated coastal economic centers. Thus, special considerations
need to be made to ensure that byproducts of agriculture, manufac-
turing, and other industry do not become systemically damaging.
VI. CHALLENGES
Perhaps Vietnam’s greatest challenge in its attempts to achieve
the objectives stated in the Socio-Economic Strategy Development
Plan of 2001-2010 has been to curtail corruption in markets, law,
176. Martin van der Schans & NGUYEN Huu Thien, “Mekong Delta: Tram Chim
National Park: The Ecosystem Approach Methodology,” in Gill Shepherd, ed., The
Ecosystem Approach: Learning from Experience, 2008, p. 77.
177. Martin van der Schans & NGUYEN Huu Thien, “Mekong Delta: Tram Chim
National Park: The Ecosystem Approach Methodology,” in Gill Shepherd, ed., The
Ecosystem Approach: Learning from Experience, 2008, p. 81.
178. World Bank, Vietnam Environmental Monitor, 2002, Hanoi, pp. 18-19.
179. Thang Nam DO & Jeff Bennett, Willingness to Pay for Wetland Improvement
in Vietnam’s Mekong River Delta, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics
Society, 51st Annual Conference, February, 2007, p. 22.
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and government. The opening of markets to new entrants such as
foreign investors, household businesses, and large non-state-owned
enterprises yielded several opportunities for corruption to promul-
gate in Vietnam. Corruption is considered extremely problematic
because of the associated efficiency losses in the allocation of re-
sources involved in the distortion and uncertain nature of “corrup-
tion taxes.”180
Vietnam’s transition toward freer market capitalism since doi
moi induced swift movements toward privatization creating a new
intermediary transactional relationship between business owners
and government officials thereby opening the window for corrup-
tive practices to flourish. For example, as of 2007, only 15% of firms
reported the state sector as a customer and only 8% of firms were
predominately supplied by a state-owned enterprise.181 In compari-
son, in 2000 approximately 25% of all firms reported the state sec-
tor as its primary customer base and as recently as 1990 nearly half
of all firms looked to the government for its primary customer ac-
count. On the other hand, the number of household, or private sec-
tor, enterprises increased from 26% in 1990 to 57% in 2000.182 The
rapid transformation of the business environment and marketplace
created repositioning among firms and customers, welcoming the
onset of corruption and questionable administrative practices.
Administrative reforms meant to address prevalent corruption
began to take center stage in Vietnam, especially after the fall of
Tamexco, Epco, and Minh Phung in the late 1990’s. In 1996, the Tan
Binh Production Service Trading and Export Company, known as
Tamexco, was exposed for corruptive practices. The Head of the
Notary Office No. 1 in Ba Ria-Vung Tau, LE Duc Canh, was dis-
covered to have artificially inflated land values of Tamexco real es-
tate holdings so that Tamexco could borrow more money from
banks using land as collateral.183 LE Duc Canh was charged with
taking bribes and exploiting his public position for personal gain.
Meanwhile, Tamexco Director PHAM Huy Phuoc and Binh Gia
180. Raymond Fisman & Jakob Svenson, “Are Corruption and Taxation Really
Harmful to Growth? Firm Level Evidence,” Journal of Development Economics, 83
(2007), pp. 63-75.
181. John Rand and Finn Tarp, “Firm-Level Corruption in Vietnam,” Economic De-
velopment and Cultural Change, 60:3 (2012), p. 578.
182. Henrik Hansen, John Rand, and Finn Tarp, “Enterprise Growth and Survival in
Vietnam: Does Government Support Matter?” The Journal of Development Studies,
45:7 (2009), p. 1057.
183. Martin Gainsborough, Changing Political Economy of Vietnam: The Case of Ho
Chi Minh City, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 84.
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Limited Company Director TRAN Quang Vinh, an accomplice,
were accused of bribery and fraud.
On January 7, 1998, PHAM Huy Phuoc, TRAN Quang Vinh,
and LE Duc Canh were executed by firing squad after being found
guilty of fraud and corruption.184 Dozens of other key figures were
found guilty of corruption related to fraudulent practices involving
Tamexco including PHAM Van Hoa, Deputy Party Secretary of the
Tan Binh District; NGUYEN Thi Minh Tam, Deputy Party Secre-
tary of the Tan Binh District; and PHAM Minh Duc, Head City
Party Financial Management Committee; and NGUYEN Van De,
General Director of Vietcombank.185
The use of the death penalty to punish corruption insinuates
that corruption is not tolerated in Vietnam. However, statistical
data indicates that corruption is often accepted as a normal and reg-
ular practice in market activities. In fact, the Investment Climate
Assessment survey taken in 2005 for Vietnam indicated that two-
thirds of firms make informal payments to economic participants as
a regular cost of doing business. The survey also found that 79% of
surveyed firms gave gifts at meetings with tax officials and 40% of
firms paid bribes to win government contracts.186
Other examples of corruption include the black markets that
emerged in response to new laws and policies. For example, when
the value-added tax was introduced in January 1999, a black market
for value-added tax invoices formed in Ho Chi Minh City. Compa-
nies were selling goods below market price by not including a
value-added tax on the transaction. Then, companies would
purchase invoices on the black market to legalize the sale to the
government. It was the governmental tax department that was sell-
ing the invoices to begin with.187
Corruption in financial markets is also a major concern in Viet-
nam, especially as the capital market system gradually evolves to-
wards free enterprise. Foreign currency exchange black markets
formed in response to the heightened demand for US dollars
(USD) that stemmed from the Asian Currency Crisis. Banks were
holding onto dollars instead of selling them to businesses that
needed to make payments to foreign counter parties in order to
fulfill letters of credit. And, devaluation of the Dong and other sur-
184. IBID, p. 87.
185. IBID, p. 83.
186. Rand and Tarp, “Firm-Level Corruption in Vietnam,” supra note 1, p. 572.
187. Gainsborough, Changing Political Economy of Vietnam, supra note 1, p. 35.
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rounding nations’ currencies created widespread demand for the
USD as a store of value. Meanwhile, businesses were no longer de-
positing revenues denominated in USD at banks, which exacer-
bated the banking system’s shortage of dollars. Hence, businesses
that could not access USDs at banks looked to the black market to
exchange Dong for dollars.
The central government implemented several economic poli-
cies in order to promote liquidity in the state’s banking system and
minimize the private sector’s reliance on foreign exchange black
markets. Decree 37 of February 1998 sought to devalue the Dong
by 5.6% and stipulated that companies holding onto USDs were
required to exchange them at banks for Dong that could be used for
domestic transactions.188 By preeminently devaluing the Dong, a
significant amount of the uncertainty related to currency valuation
and inflation was eliminated. As a result, spreads between the black
market price of dollars and the banks’ rates narrowed signifi-
cantly,189 limiting the profits that could be realized through foreign
exchange black markets.
The legal standards and norms of corruptive practices in Viet-
nam are both complex and ambivalent. Without a fully functioning
norm-based legal system, connections between political and bu-
reaucratic factions may be considered necessary to provide cer-
tainty in an environment laden with administrative discretion and
unclear rules.190 Prior to gaining national independence in 1975, Vi-
etnam had been surviving under a form of legal plurality, where
Chinese, French, and American laws, doctrines, and sanctions, gov-
erned civil activity. From the post-war period to the onset of doi
moi, collective organizational methods were institutionalized in a
failed effort to increase production and resource allocation to Viet-
nam’s citizenry. Abrupt centralization amidst a historically divided
nation presented several barriers between cultural groups. In the
late 1980’s and into the 1990’s, fence breaking (vuot rao) was
adopted as a pragmatic response to reducing transactional risk
given a socialist political economic structure.191 The transformation
from central planning to market licensing diminished the power of
188. Gainsborough, Changing Political Economy of Vietnam, supra note 2, p. 73.
189. Gainsborough, Changing Political Economy of Vietnam, supra note 3, p. 73.
190. HOANG Kim Giao & NGUYEN Doc Thang, “A Profile of Vietnamese Own-
ers of Private Enterprises,” Vietnam Investment Review, 4:27 (1995), pp. 29-30.
191. John Gillespie, “Law and Development in ‘The Market Place:’ An East Asian
Perspective,” in Kanishka Jayasuriya, ed., Law, Capitalism, and Power in Asia: The
Rule of Law and Legal Institutions, 1999, p. 117.
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the central government and redistributed authority to middle-rank-
ing local and provincial public officials, exacerbating bureaucratic
inertia, obfuscation, and corruption.192
The lines of a command and control centrally planned econ-
omy were dissolving, thereby enabling autonomous bureaucracies
to display extreme bureaucratic discretion. The market economy
behavior during the 1990’s was polarized between binary alterna-
tives: lawful-licensed and unlawful-unlicensed.193, Licensed activi-
ties were increasingly entrenched by nha nuoc phap quyen (state
legal rights), whereby licensure could be overtly used to proscribe
market outcomes. Vietnam’s economic reliance on foreign direct in-
vestment in addition to the emergence of a household economic
sector disabled the viability of a lopsided statutory framework.
Socialist law provides bureaucrats with directives and guidance
for administration of a rigid, uniform institutional framework. Poli-
cies aimed at creating a rights-based instead of rules-based legal
system to combat corruption were not being coupled with academic
and cultural understanding.194 The Civil Code of 1995 sought to ad-
dress Vietnam’s movement toward increased political, economic,
and personal freedoms when engaging in civil relations. More spe-
cifically, Article 7 stipulates the right to voluntarily undertake
agreements without being hindered by another party. Furthermore,
Article 4 states that favorable conditions must be created for ethnic
minorities and civil rights promoted for the young, elderly, and dis-
abled. The government’s introduction of a rights-based civil code
supported the privatization that was rapidly taking place and coin-
cided with the normalization of United States-Vietnam political re-
lations in 1995, after the United States trade embargo was lifted in
1994.
In a socialist republic, the collective interest is materially held
as a high priority. Despite the personal liberties guaranteed in the
Civil Code of 1995, Article 2 specifies that establishment and per-
192. NGUYEN Nien, Administrative Reform in Vietnam, Unpublished Research
Paper No. 4, Canberra: Australian International Legal Cooperation Program, 1996, pp.
5-10.
193. John Gillespie, “Law and Development in ‘The Market Place:’ An East Asian
Perspective,” in Kanishka Jayasuriya, ed., Law, Capitalism, and Power in Asia: The
Rule of Law and Legal Institutions, 1999, p. 118.
194. Mark Sidel, “Law Reform in Vietnam: The Complex Transition from Socialism
and Soviet Models in Legal Scholarship and Timing,” UCLA Pacific Basin Law Jour-
nal, 11 (1993), pp. 223-228.
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formance of civil rights must not infringe upon State interests.195
Civil reforms have cast the state as a defender, or even creator, of
capital markets, serving as a destabilizing role for the communist
party that has devoted considerable resources to disrupting and de-
stroying markets in the past.196
Governmental efforts to pinpoint the cause of widespread cor-
ruption have been geared towards attaining separation between
politics and public administration. One way of doing so is to form a
bureaucratic meritocracy, where a lack thereof has been the largest
impediment to the emergence of neo-liberal institutional develop-
ment in Vietnam.197 The ruling Communist Party of Vietnam pro-
vided a cooperative network for political action but the absence of
an administrative apparatus that legitimized dissident voices caused
for spoils and inefficiencies to aggravate market activities.
The Public Administration Reform (PAR) Master Program of
2001-2010 provides a legal framework for Vietnam’s contiguous
market reform with the implementation of a robust public adminis-
trative system operating according to rule-of-law.198 PAR supported
the New Enterprise Law of 2000, enveloping some level of account-
ability in the booming private sector. From 2000 to 2004, over
90,000 private enterprises were registered with the government.199
Over the same period, reform of state-owned enterprises and the
banking sector was planned. From 2003 to 2005, 945 state-owned
enterprises were restructured to create more fluid administrative
arrangements and to rebalance a playing field traditionally seen as
being uneven.200
On December 10, 2001, the United States-Vietnam Bilateral
Trade Agreement (BTA) came into being, opening up the United
195. Socialist Republic of Vietnam, The Civil Code of the Socialist Republic of Viet-
nam, Ninth Legislature, 8th Session, October 3-28, 1995. Part One, ch. I.
196. DO Nguyen Phuong, On the Phenomenon of Social Stratification in Our Coun-
try at Present, Tap Chi Cong San (Communist Review) May, 1994.
197. NGUYEN Duy Gia, Training and Developing the State Administrative Person-
nel, International Colloquium on Public Administration Reform. Hanoi: UNDP, Sep-
tember 24-26, 1996, pp. 7-12.
198. Government of Vietnam, United Nations Development Programme. Public Ad-
ministration Reform http://undp.org.vn/what-we-do/focus-areas/democratic-govern-
ance/public-administration-reform.
199. VO Tri Thanh, “Economic Reforms in Vietnam: What Lessons can be Learnt?”
in Janos Kornai & Yingyi QIAN, eds., Market and Socialism: In the Light of Experiences
of China and Vietnam, 2009, p. 188.
200. VO Tri Thanh, “Economic Reforms in Vietnam: What Lessons can be Learnt?”
in Janos Kornai & Yingyi QIAN, eds., Market and Socialism: In the Light of Experiences
of China and Vietnam, 2009, p. 188.
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States market to Vietnamese exporters. The BTA was a “stepping-
stone” towards Vietnamese accession into the WTO, which was
achieved on January 11, 2007.201 Trading rights, tariffs, quantity re-
strictions, intellectual property rights, investment measures, and
transparency were included in the BTA, conforming to WTO
norms.
In 2005, the National Anti-Corruption Committee was estab-
lished to oversee the investigation of complaints, symbolize the gov-
ernment’s commitment to address corruption seriously, and
emphasize media attention on the issue of corruption.202 Wide-
spread corruption was still taking place across the country in a vari-
ety of forms. On a larger-scale, enterprise firms pay bribes to
government officials in exchange for government contracts. On a
smaller-scale, bribes are regularly paid to police offices and clerical
offices. Lacking organic solutions, the Communist Party of Vietnam
and the Government of Vietnam looked to the United Nations De-
velopment Program (UNDP) for assistance in development of anti-
corruption strategies.203
The efforts of the National Anti-Corruption Committee of
2005 and the partnership with the UNDP have been successful in
reducing corruption in Vietnam. As a direct result of the Anti-Cor-
ruption Committee, the number of enterprises in Vietnam that
were inspected increased from 45% in 2005 to 56% in 2007.204 And,
the number of firms that reported making an informal payment or
bribe decreased from 37% in 2005 to 23% in 2007.205
Most importantly, public awareness regarding ethical behavior
has been raised. Individuals and firms found guilty of corruption
have attracted media attention, serving to educate market partici-
pants that corruptive practices do not need to be a way of business.
The discourse transpiring from anti-corruption laws represents a
cultural shift: the Vietnamese people began to realize that political
201. Stephen Parker, “Vietnam’s Road to International Economic Integration with a
Socialist Orientation: Are WTO Accession and Market Socialism Compatible?” in
Eds., Janos Kornai & Yingyi QIAN, eds., Market and Socialism: In the Light of Exper-
iences of China and Vietnam, 2009, p. 200.
202. Rand and Tarp, “Firm-Level Corruption in Vietnam,” supra note 2, p. 571.
203. John Gillespie, “The Political-Legal Culture of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Vi-
etnam,” in Timothy Lindsey & Howard Dick, eds., Corruption in Asia: Rethinking the
Governance Paradigm, 2002, p. 167.
204. Rand and Tarp, “Firm-Level Corruption in Vietnam,” supra note 3, p. 574.
205. Rand and Tarp, “Firm-Level Corruption in Vietnam,” supra note 4, p. 574.
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and social matrices shape the capacity to support behavioral
change.206
One such social matrix is the Governance and Public Adminis-
tration Performance Index that examines citizens’ interactions with
the government at three levels: local, provincial, and national.207 In
2010, the Performance Index was administered in 30 of the nation’s
63 provinces, with 5,568 randomly selected participants.208 Based
on the results, public policy action plans are developed and imple-
mented according to the needs of each province.
Of course, the continuous challenge to tackling corruption in
Vietnam has to do with its one-party system, where graft looms as a
threat to a bustling market capitalist system. Not surprisingly, the
Vietnam Fatherland Front, a mass-political organization of the so-
cialist republic, sponsored the Performance Index research pro-
gram. The government did employ the UNDP for policy and
advisory consulting services demonstrating the government’s will-
ingness to surrender socialist mechanisms in favor of the opportu-
nity to participate in markets, representative of the capitalist nation
that Vietnam has become.
The second major challenge for Vietnam is to mitigate the mar-
itime dispute over the South China Sea, or East Sea (Bien Dong) as
it is referred to in Vietnam, which has been an ongoing conflict
among Asian countries in the Southeast region. Vital resources and
surplus value enjoyed from exporting consumable goods such as
coffee, rice, fish, and oil are being directed towards patrol of the
waterways and national defense with the expectation that a conflict
may ensue in the near future. The South China Sea covers an area
of 800,000 square kilometers and extends over 1800 miles from Su-
matra to Taiwan, linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and also
helps to form the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda.209 In ad-
206. John Gillespie, “The Political-Legal Culture of Anti-Corruption in Vietnam,” in
Timothy Lindsay & Howard Dick, eds., Corruption in Asia: Rethinking the Governance
Paradigm, p. 195.
207. United Nations Development Programme, Viet Nam: Citizens’ Experiences
Helping to Shape Anti-Corruption Policy, December 9, 2011 http://www.undp.org/con
tent/undp/en/home/presscenter/articles/2011/12/09/viet-nam-citizens-experiences-help
ing-to-shape-anti-corruption-policy/.
208. United Nations Development Programme, Viet Nam: Citizens’ Experiences
Helping to Shape Anti-Corruption Policy, December 9, 2011 http://www.undp.org/con
tent/undp/en/home/presscenter/articles/2011/12/09/viet-nam-citizens-experiences-help
ing-to-shape-anti-corruption-policy/.
209. JI Guoxing, “Maritime Jurisdiction and Maritime Security Cooperation in South
China Sea,” in TRAN Truong Thuy, ed., The South China Sea: Cooperation for Re-
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dition to the navigational rights of the Sea, the maritime dispute
extends to the occupation of island archipelagos and mineral rights.
For example, both China and Vietnam claim the Paracel Islands.
Meanwhile, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, each claim the Spratly Is-
lands, which is considered the most contested land on Earth, in its
entirety.210 The Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei partially claim in-
terest in the Spratly’s, which is occupied by all claimants except
Brunei. Additionally, the Scarborough Shoal is claimed by China,
Taiwan, and the Philippines.211
Historically, it is unclear which countries have rights to the
Paracel and Spratly Islands. For example, China has claimed the
islands for more than 2000 years while Vietnam has presented evi-
dence indicating 16th century ownership of the Paracel and Spratly
Islands as shown on a Portuguese nautical map that depicts the
Paracel and Spratly Islands as a continuous archipelago just off the
Vietnamese coastline.212 It is possible that the clustering of the Is-
lands and over-exaggerated proximity to mainland Vietnam could
have been the result of negligence to the northerly situated Spratly
Islands, rather than an implied association between Vietnam and
the Spratly Islands.
Vietnamese maps of the 17th century note that “there was a
long sandbank in the middle of the sea that is called Bai Cat Vang
(Golden Sand),” and that “during the last month of every winter,
the Nguyen rulers send 18 boats there to collect goods, mainly jew-
elries, money, guns, and ammunition,”213 indicating that the Paracel
Islands belonged to Vietnam at the time. During the 18th century,
several books of maps were published in Vietnam that served to
uphold Vietnam’s earlier claim of the Paracel and Spratly Is-
gional Security and Development, Proceedings of the International Workshop, organ-
ized by Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and Vietnam Lawyers Association, November
26-27, 2009, p. 31.
210. Daniel J. Dzurek, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who’s on First? Maritime Brief-
ing, 2:1, International Boundaries Research Unit, 1996, p. 1.
211. Ronald O’Rourke, April 9, 2013. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research
Service. p. 1.
212. Historical Documents on Vietnam’s Sovereignty over Paracel and Spratly Is-
lands, VietnamNet Bridge http://english.vietnamnet.vn/en/special-report/9787/historical-
documents-on-vietnam-s-sovereignty-over-paracel-and-spratly-islands.html.
213. DO Ba, Toan Tap Thien Nam Tu Chi Lo Do Thu (The Handbook of the South’s
Road Map), Maps of Quang Ngai Prefecture in Quang Nam.
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lands.214 One contemporary argument holds that treating the
Paracel and Spratly Islands, Bai Cat Vang, as a singular entity is
unrealistic, given their 400 kilometers distance apart.215
In 1946, during World War II, the Republic of China’s Kuomin-
tang took control of the Paracel and Spratly Islands and issued a
map hi-lighting the “eleven-dash line,” later revised to the “nine-
dash line,” whereby China’s territorial claim was drawn to include
virtually all areas of the South China Sea except those immediately
partitioning against other nations. On September 7, 1951, Vietnam
declared ownership over the Paracel and Spratly Islands,216 which
had belonged to the French colony in 1933 before being relin-
quished to Japan on March 30, 1939.217 Thereupon, on September 8,
1951, the Treaty of San Francisco, annulling Japan of all claims to
the South China Sea Islands as a result of the defeat of its empire,
left Vietnam and China as the only two remaining regional powers
competing for the South China Sea, resulting in uneasy maritime
relations between Vietnam and China.
On January 19, 1974, the Chinese Navy sank one Vietnamese
frigate, capturing 49 men on board, and occupying the Paracel Is-
lands by seizing military installations that were previously sustained
by South Vietnamese forces, while simultaneously laying claim to
the Spratly Islands.218 Chinese ships were hit numerous times but
the extent of the damage is disputed. On June 11, 1978, the Philip-
pines officially entered the mix through Decree No. 1596, setting
forth their claim over all of Spratly Islands, including Itu Aba, the
largest island of the archipelago which Taiwan had previously laid
claim to, as well as to several islands that Vietnam was claiming.219
Another naval battle erupted near the Spratly Islands in March
1988 where Chinese forces sank three Vietnamese supply ships, kill-
214. Duke BUI The Dat, Giap Ngo Binh Nam Do (The Map for the Pacification of
the South in the Giap Ngo Year), 1774; LE Quy Don, Phu Bien Tap Luc (Miscellany on
the Pacification at the Frontier), 1776.
215. Daniel J. Dzurek, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who’s on First? Maritime Brief-
ing, 2:1, International Boundaries Research Unit, 1996, p. 8.
216. Dieter Heinzig, Disputed Islands in the South China Sea: Paracels, Spratlys,
Pratas, Macclesfield Bank. Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, Germany, 1976.
217. Hanns J. Buchholz, Law of the Sea Zones in the Pacific Ocean, Singapore: Insti-
tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987, p. 44.
218. Jae-Hyung LEE, China and the Asia-Pacific Region: Geostrategic Relations and
a Naval Dimension. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2003, p. 74.
219. IBID, p. 45.
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ing 72 Vietnamese sailors and taking 9 as prisoners.220 Then, on
February 8, 1995, Filipino fishermen discovered that China had
swiftly built wooden structures and were flying a Chinese flag on
Mischief Reef,221 a large reef of the Spratly Islands roughly 200 ki-
lometers from the Philippine island of Palawan. President Fidel V.
Ramos of the Philippines sent warships and fighter planes to the
area of Mischief Reef but the conflicted quickly deescalated.222
Again, tempers flared between China and the Philippines in early
1999, shortly after China completed construction of a five-story for-
tified cement building alongside the three wooden octagonal struc-
tures that were previously erected on Mischief Reef in February
1995.223
The Paracel and Spratly Islands of the South China Sea, de-
spite being less than 8 and 4 square kilometers of land area respec-
tively, provide several concessions to the claimant. First, the Islands
provide a piece of dry land to taxi aircraft, both military and civil-
ian. A landing strip has been constructed by the Philippines on the
6.2-hectare island Pulau Layang and on the 37.2-hectare Thitu Is-
land of the Spratly Islands.224 China manages Taiping Island Air-
port on Itu Ban and Vietnam controls an airport on the island of
Truong Sa Lon.225 China’s Yongxing Island, known as Woody Is-
land to Westerners and Dao Phu Lam in Vietnamese, contains the
only airport in the Paracel Islands.
Next, the small above-water landmasses of the Islands are con-
nected to mineral-rich coral reefs spread out over an extremely
large area of the sea. For example, the Reed Bank is a submerged
atoll northeast of the Spratly Islands and Macclesfield Bank is a
220. Michael Richardson, “Spratly’s Increasing Cause for Concern,” Asia-Pacific De-
fence Reporter, 19, October-November 1992, p. 35.
221. Lt. Col. Stanley E. Meyer, Incident at Mischief Reef: Implications for the Phil-
ippines, China, and the United States, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,
1996, p. 1.
222. Philip Shenon, “Manila Sees China Threat On Coral Reef,” New York Times,
February 19, 1995 http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/19/world/manila-sees-china-threat-
on-coral-reef.html.
223. Christopher C. Joyner, “The Spratly Islands Dispute in the South China Sea:
Problems, Policies, and Prospects for Diplomatic Accomodation,” in Ranjeet K.
SINGH, ed., Investigating Confidence-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region,
Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, May 14, 1999, p. 54.
224. Dallen J. Timothy, “Tourism, War, and Political Instability: Territorial and Re-
ligious Perspectives,” in Richard Butler & Wantanee Suntikul, eds., Tourism and War,
New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 16.
225. “Vietnam Rebuilds Spratly Airport,” BBC News, May 14, 2004 http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3714627.stm.
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continuum of submerged shoals and reefs between the Paracel Is-
lands and Scarborough Shoal.226 As difficult as it may be to set ju-
risdiction over areas of land that are submerged and may extend
below the sea bottom, classifying the geographic masses is equally
taxing, considering that Macclesfield Bank, despite being sub-
merged in water below sea level, is referred to as the Zhongsha
Islands by China.227
Fourth, and most significantly, ownership of the Paracel and
Spratly Islands constitutes the establishment of economic zones, ex-
tending up to 200 miles beyond a nation’s coast, giving nearly all of
the mineral exploration and excavation rights of the South China
Sea to the Islands’ sovereignty, considering that the approximately
750 reefs, islets, atolls, cays, and islands of the Spratly Islands alone,
span a sea area of greater than 425,000 square kilometers, with the
30 islets, sandbanks, and reefs of the Paracel Islands covering an
additional 15,000 square kilometers of the ocean surface. According
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS), a nation has the right under international law to regulate
foreign military and commercial activities of the sea within 200 nau-
tical miles of its coast and all respective activities of the continental
shelf within 350 nautical miles of its coast; this is also known as an
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Aside from the difficulties in deciding who owns which coast-
lines, there is the issue of deciding when “natural prolongation” of a
continental shelf ends and how to rule in the case of overlapping
sea zones due to concave coastlines.228 An EEZ is different from
areas of bona-fide national sovereignty such as a territorial seas that
extend 12 nautical miles from a nation’s coastline and contiguous
zones extending 24 nautical miles from the coastline that provides a
nation authority over customs, culture, immigration, and sanitary
226. Ronald O’Rourke, April 9, 2013. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research
Service. p. 3.
227. Ronald O’Rourke, April 9, 2013. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research
Service. p. 3.
228. Geoffrey Till, “South China Sea: Just Waiting for the Breeze?” in TRAN
Truong Thuy, ed., The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Devel-
opment, Proceedings of the International Workshop, organized by Diplomatic Acad-
emy of Vietnam and Vietnam Lawyers Association, November 26-27, 2009, p. 17.
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laws.229 China’s claim over the four major archipelagos in the nauti-
cal region, including the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea that
are currently being claimed by China, Japan, and Taiwan, geograph-
ically extends China’s EEZ to an area covering nearly the entire
South and East China Seas.
Oil exploration and drilling rights have been the source of
much conflict in the South China Sea, especially with China being
the world’s second largest consumer and net importer of oil in the
world and Vietnam’s standing as Asia-Pacific’s third largest pro-
ducer.230 As an example, on October 31, 2011, about two months
after Exxon Mobil Corporation was granted a license from the
Vietnamese government to explore blocks 117, 118, and 119 and
made a significant discovery off the Da Nang coast,231 Chinese For-
eign Ministry spokesman HONG Lei offered the following conten-
tion at a briefing: “China has the indisputable sovereignty over the
Spratly Islands and adjacent waters.”232 Meanwhile, in July 2012,
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) invited bids
for a batch of oil exploration blocks that Vietnam had already li-
censed to Oil & Natural Gas Corporation, Gazprom OAO, and Ex-
xon Mobil for exploration and extraction purposes.233
Previously, there had been some positive attempts to curtail
jurisdictional disputes over oil. In October 2008, a strategic cooper-
ative agreement was signed between CNOOC and Pe-
troVietnam.234 Additionally, ASEAN member-states proactively
involved Chinese and other non-ASEAN energy companies in co-
operative mineral exploration and drilling in less disputed areas of
229. U.S. Maritime Limits and Boundaries, Office of Coast Survey, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, United States Department of Commerce http://www.
nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/csdl/mbound.htm.
230. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics & Analysis
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-date.cfm?fips=CH.
231. Ben Bland, Leslie Hook, and Sheila McNulty, “U.S. Gas Find Off Vietnam
Adds to China Tension,” Financial Times, October 26, 2011 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/e5674186-ffe5-11e0-ba79-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2xeeinafv.
232. Sui-Lee WEE and Ed Lane, “China Again Warns Foreign Oil Firms on South
China Sea Exploration,” Reuters, Beijing, October 31, 2011 http://in.reuters.com/article/
2011/10/31/idinindia-60218620111031.
233. Simon Hall, “Vietnam to Push Ahead With Offshore Exploration,” Wall Street
Journal, April 4, 2013 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578402
153203245638.html
234. Mingjiang LI, “China and Maritime Cooperation in East Asia: Recent Develop-
ments and Future Prospects,” Journal of Contemporary China, 19:64 (2010), p. 302.
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the South China Sea.235 Cooperative efforts have the potential to
be quashed by the complexity of stakeholder interests. For exam-
ple, Vietnam’s largest oil producing company Vietsovpetro (VSP), a
long-standing joint venture between PetroVietnam and
Zarubezhneft of Russia, continues to operate the Bach Ho, Rong,
and Rong Southeast oilfields, with a secured partnership through
the year 2031. Other state-run oil companies that have partnered
with Vietnam in oil production activities include Korea National Oil
Corporation (KNOC), Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited of
India (ONGC), and Petronas of Malaysia, among other companies
that are publicly held such as Nippon of Japan, PTTEP of Thailand,
and British Petroleum.236
On May 26, 2011, two Chinese maritime surveillance vessels
severed the exploration cables of a Vietnamese oil ship, Binh Minh,
that was searching for oil and gas deposits within Vietnam’s EEZ
approximately 120 kilometers off the southern Vietnamese coast.237
In response, JIANG Yu, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman,
declared that China had engaged in “completely normal marine en-
forcement and surveillance activities in China’s jurisdictional
area.”238 Soon thereafter, on June 9, 2011, a Chinese fishing boat
rammed the survey cables of a second Vietnamese exploration
vessel.239
The fishing industries of China and ASEAN nations have also
been held at bay as a result of the maritime dispute. For instance,
the Paracel Islands are equidistant from Chinese and Vietnamese
coastlines, and are known as Xisha in Chinese and Hoang Sa in
Vietnamese. Since 1974, the Paracel Islands have been under Chi-
nese control. In 1999, China officially imposed an annual fishing
ban in the South China Sea, covering the area surrounding the
235. Leszek Buszynski and Iskandar Sazlan, “Maritime Claims and Energy Coopera-
tion in the South China Sea,” Journal of Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29:1 (2007), pp.
143-171.
236. Energy Information Administration, Vietnam, Sector Organization, May 9, 2012
http://www.eia.gov/cabs/vietnam/pdf.pdf.
237. Alex Watts, “Tensions Rise As Vietnam Accuses China of Sabotage,” The Syd-
ney Morning Herald, June 2, 2011 http://www.smh.com.au/world/tensions-rise-as-viet-
nam-accuses-china-of-sabotage-20110601-1fgno.html.
238. “China Reprimands Vietnam Over Offshore Oil Exploration,” Reuters, May 28,
2011 http://af.reuters.com/article/energyoilnews/idafl3e7gs07e20110528.
239. Leszek Buszynski, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China
Strategic Rivalry,” The Washington Quarterly, (Spring 2012), p. 141.
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Paracel Islands,240 from June to July, and extending the ban in 2009
to cover the period from May 16 to August 1.241 To enforce the
fishing ban and its EEZ in general, China announced plans to in-
crease the size of maritime surveillance forces to 16 aircraft and 350
vessels by 2015.242
The political party in Hanoi accused China of detaining hun-
dreds of fishermen around the area and impounding their boats. In
fact, the Vietnamese claim that 63 fishing boats containing 725
crewmembers have been seized by China in the South China Sea
since 2005,243 and have been required to pay extraordinary fees to
be released.244 In an escalation of conflict, Chinese vessels targeted
several Vietnamese fishing boats through use of explicit force. On
March 20, 2013, near the Paracel Islands, China allegedly attacked a
Vietnamese fishing boat, burning down its cabin.245 Two months
later, on May 20, 2013, about 27 nautical miles off the Quang Ngai
Province’s Tri Ton Island of the Paracel Islands, 18 Chinese vessels
surrounded a Vietnamese fishing boat.246
The outreach of the South China Sea maritime dispute extends
beyond that of Asian nations. The United States became increas-
ingly involved in the territorial dispute when Bill Clinton was the
first United States President to visit a united Vietnam in November
2000.247 United States’ involvement in the South China Sea mari-
time dispute is mostly geared towards China’s declaration over ju-
risdiction of all islands of the Sea, which severely limits foreign
nations such as the United States from achieving safe navigational
mobility in the Southeast Asia region. China argues that military
activities within their EEZ, such as the United States’ Sensitive Re-
240. “Unilateral Fishing Ban Likely to Fuel Tension,” South China Morning Post,
May 17, 2010.
241. Ibid, p. 143.
242. WANG Qian, “Maritime Forces to be Beefed Up Amid Disputes,” China Daily,
June 17, 2011 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-06/17/content_12718632.htm.
243. Seth Mydans, “U.S. and Vietnam Build Ties With an Eye on China,” The New
York Times, October 12, 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/world/asia/13viet
nam.html.
244. Buszynski, “Oil, Maritime Claims, and Strategic Rivalry in South China Sea,”
supra note 1, 143.
245. Jeremy Page, “Hanoi Says Chinese Shot At Boat,” Wall Street Journal http://
online.wsj.com/article/sb10001424127887324789504578383820145232386.html
246. “Vietnam Condemns China for Attach on Fishermen Off Paracels,” Thanh Nien
News, May 28, 2013 http://www.thanhniennews.com/index/pages/20130525-vietnam-
boat-reports-of-attack-by-china-boat.aspx.
247. Buszynski, “Oil, Maritime Claims, and Strategic Rivalry in South China Sea,”
supra note 2, p. 149.
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connaissance Operations (SRO) and Special Mission Ships (SMS),
violate the “peaceful purposes” provisions of UNCLOS Articles 88,
141, and 301.248 Conversely, the United States argues that intelli-
gence collection and military marine data collection may be con-
ducted without coastal state notice or consent under UNCLOS
Articles 56, 58, and 86.249 UNCLOS Article 19 also stipulates that
foreign vessels may not commit “any act aimed at collecting infor-
mation to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal
state.”250
Despite the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
(MMCA), signed by China and the United States in January
1998,251 there have been numerous incidents between the United
States and China where it is evident that the implications of the
South China Sea and East China Sea maritime dispute extends be-
yond Asian countries. First, on March 23, 2001, and later in Septem-
ber of 2002,252 the hydrographic survey ship USNS Bowditch was
conducting routine military survey operations within China’s EEZ
of the Yellow Sea, when it was confronted by a Chinese Jianheu III-
class frigate and instructed to leave the EEZ. The unarmed Bow-
ditch vacated the area and days later returned to the EEZ with an
armed United States escort.253 Then, on April 1, 2001, a People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) naval F-8 fighter jet collided with a United
States Navy EP-3 electronic surveillance aircraft that was flying 65
miles southeast of China’s Hainan Island in the South China Sea.254
The United States’ crew made an emergency landing on the PLA’s
248. Pete Pedrozo, “The U.S.-China Incidents at Sea Agreement: A Recipe for Dis-
aster,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 6:207 (2012), p. 218.
249. Ibid.
250. Ibid.
251. Pete Pedrozo, “The U.S.-China Incidents at Sea Agreement: A Recipe for Dis-
aster.” Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 6:207 (2012), p. 208; Agreement on
Establishing a Consultation Mechanism To Strengthen Military Maritime Safety, U.S.-
China, T.I.A.S. No. 12,924, January 19, 1998.
252. Erik Eckholm, “China Complains About U.S. Surveillance Ship,” The New
York Times, September 27, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/27/world/china-com-
palins-about-us-surveillance-ship.html.
253. Raul Pedrozo, “Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident,” Na-
val War College Review, 62:3 (Summer 2009), p. 101.
254. Ronald O’Rourke, April 9, 2013. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research
Service. p. 4.
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Lingshui airfield on Hainan Island and the 24 crewmembers were
detained for 11 days.255
United States’ involvement in the South China Sea maritime
dispute was again exacerbated in March of 2009.256 On March 4, a
Chinese Bureau of Fisheries Patrol vessel illuminated the USNS
Victorious, including its bridge crew, several times when the Victori-
ous was conducting military operations in the Yellow Sea, about 125
nautical miles from China’s coast. On March 5, a Chinese Y-12
maritime surveillance aircraft conducted 12 fly-bys of Victorious at
a low altitude of about 400 feet and a range of 500 yards, and a
Chinese frigate proceeded to cross the bow of the USNS Impecca-
ble at a range of approximately 100 yards, followed by 11 fly-bys of
the Impeccable at an altitude of 600 feet and a range of around 200
feet. On March 7, a Chinese intelligence collection ship (AGI)
threatened that there would be consequences if the USNS Impecca-
ble did not leave the area.
The build-up reached a climax when, on March 8, 2009, ap-
proximately 75 miles from Hainan Island in the South China Sea,
five Chinese vessels, an AGI, a Fisheries Law Enforcement Com-
mand patrol vessel (FLEC), a State Oceanographic Administration
patrol vessel (SOA), and two small Chinese-flagged trawlers,
shadowed and aggressively maneuvered dangerously close to the
USNS Impeccable. The Chinese vessels surrounded the USNS Im-
peccable and waved Chinese flags as an indication that the Impecca-
ble must leave the area. The Impeccable sprayed fire hoses at one of
the Chinese vessels. In response, two of the People’s Republic of
China vessels closed in on the Impeccable, forcing it to conduct an
emergency “all stop” in order to avoid collision. Pieces of wood
were also dropped in the Impeccable’s immediate path.257
Such adversarial conduct between the United States and China
led to a common bond between the Vietnamese and the United
States’ naval interests. In August 2010, the USS George Washington
cruised along the Vietnamese coastline while hosting on-board vis-
255. Shirley A. Kan, Coordinator, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April
2001: Assessments and Policy Implications. Congressional Research Service, Report for
Congress, Summary, Order Code RL30946, October 10, 2001.
256. Jonathan G. Odom, “The True ‘Lies’ of The Impeccable Incident: What Really
Happened, Who Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of
China) Should be Concerned,” Michigan State Journal of International Law, 18:3
(2010), p. 414.
257. Pentagon Statement, supra note 2; Press Release, Jim Garamone, Armed Forces
Press Service, Chinese Vessels Shadow, Harass Unarmed U.S. Surveillance Ship, March
9, 2009.
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its from Vietnamese military officials.258 A year later, on August 23,
2011, the USNS Richard E. Byrd embarked from Cam Ranh Bay in
southern Vietnam after seven-days of undergoing repairs and
restocking at the shipyard, the first time a United States Navy ves-
sel called at a Vietnamese port in over three decades. The two
countries’ navies also held joint noncombat-training exercises in
July 2011.259
It is rather inconceivable to believe that Vietnam would be-
come aggressive towards China, even if supported by United States’
might, especially given the two neighboring countries’ bilateral
trade accounts amounted to $21.1 billion in 2009 and $25.4 billion in
2010.260 Despite the constant flaring up of tensions between Viet-
nam and China over jurisdiction of the South China Sea, considera-
ble efforts have been made to dampen tensions. Beginning in 2002,
China and the 10 members states of ASEAN agreed to resolve their
territorial and jurisdictional disputes using peaceful means when
they signed a non-binding Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of
Parties in the South China Sea in which the 11 participating nations
reaffirmed their commitment to the Charter of the United Nations,
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.261
More recently, from September 5-9, 2011, China’s foreign pol-
icy coordinator, State Councilor DAI Bingguo, visited Hanoi for
the fifth meeting of the China-Vietnam Steering Committee on Co-
operation where he issued a statement that “both sides agreed to
boost coordination in regional affairs and to promote China-
ASEAN relations. . .to properly handle their dispute over the South
China Sea through deep consultation to maintain friendly relations
258. Margie Mason, “Former Enemies U.S., Vietnam Now Military Mates,” Associ-
ated Press, August 8, 2010 http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2010-08-071453818
316_x.htm.
259. James Hookway, “Old U.S. Foe Proves Useful in Asia,” Wall Street Journal,
November 18, 2011 http://online.wsj.com/article/sb10001424052970203611404577043902
785729334.html.
260. Ning ZHANG, “Research on Trading Relations between China and Vietnam,”
Journal of Engineering, 1:2 (2012), p. 30.
261. ASEAN, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea http://
www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-par-
ties-in-the-south-china-sea.
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between the two countries.”262 The following month, on October
11, 2011 the Chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s Na-
tional People’s Congress (NPC) met with the General Secretary of
the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee NGUYEN
Phu Trong in Beijing to vow for equality, mutual respect, and com-
mon development between the two nations.263 Furthermore, on Oc-
tober 15, 2011, China and Vietnam agreed to increase contacts
between high-ranking officers and established a hotline between
the defense ministries in order to reaffirm their political will to ne-
gotiate maritime issues through friendly consultations, including the
desire to achieve steady progress towards demarcating the Beibu
Gulf. Additionally, China and Vietnam agreed to participate in
joint patrols along the coastlines, the Gulf of Tonkin, and to discuss
joint development of the nautical region.264
Amidst the numerous acts of political gesturing, both positive
and negative, between Vietnam and China, Vietnam has become
intent on developing a modern submarine fleet by 2017 in order to
compete with the impressive naval fleet China rolled out between
1996 and 2006, consisting of 30 submarines.265 Also, China has
shown progress in the development of sea mine laying and mine-
sweeping technologies to combat the expected Vietnamese naval
threat.266 In December 2009, a formal contract was executed be-
tween the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense and
Rosoboronexport, a Russian arms exporter, for Vietnam’s purchase
of six Project 636M kilo-class, Varshavyanka non-nuclear fast attack
submarines (SSK) for $300-$350 million per unit including mainte-
nance and crew training, later revised to $500 million per unit; the
262. “China, Vietnam Agree to Boost Forward-Looking Bilateral Relations,”
Xinhua, September 6, 2011 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-09/06/c_
131106560.htm.
263. “China Vows to Properly Handle Problems in Relations with Vietnam,”
Xinhua, October 11, 2011 http://news.xinuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-10/11/c_131
185528.htm.
264. Melanie Lee and Sanjeev Miglani, “China and Vietnam to Strengthen Ties: Re-
port,” Reuters, October 15, 2011 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/15/us-china-vi-
etnam-idustre79eoir20111015.
265. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Ca-
pabilities, Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, Report
to Congress, Order Code RL33153, Washington, DC, October 8, 2008, p. 12.
266. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, “Chinese Mine
Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability,” Naval War College China Mari-
time Studies, 3 (June 2009), pp. 1-94.
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signing was witnessed by President Vladimir Putin and Prime Min-
ister NGUYEN Tan Dung.267
From May 12-15, 2013, Dung visited the Russian seaport of
Kaliningrad to inspect the testing progress of the first completed
submarine, the Hanoi, built at Russia’s Admiralteiskie Verfi ship-
yard in St. Petersburg.268 Thereupon, from June 19 to the 21 of
2013, Vietnam’s President TRUONG Tan Sang spent three days in
China amid heightening conflict over the South China Sea.269 Addi-
tional attempts of diplomacy came just after an anti-China protest
took place in Hanoi on June 3, 2013, where over a dozen
Vietnamese demonstrators were taken away in buses by police.270
The third major challenge Vietnam faces is rectifying the grow-
ing levels of unhappiness being reported and experienced by its citi-
zens. The main predicaments involve quagmires in the areas of
health, the economy, and governance. In addition to post traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) and birth complications that are attributed
to exposure to Agent Orange during the Vietnam War, which is
now considered by the United States’ Department of Veterans Af-
fairs to also be a possible cause of Type 2 diabetes,271 the urbaniza-
tion of Vietnam has led to poor lifestyle choices of citizens, who
then suffer from non-communicable disease (NCD) epidemics.
Meanwhile, a stagnant economy has hurt businesses and strained
the government’s vital resources. To make matters worse, citizens
are increasingly becoming resistant to the SRV’s limitations on
freedom of speech and other characteristics of democracy restricted
by the Vietnamese government.
In the 1990s, diabetes was prevalent in about 1% to 2% of the
population in the major cities of Hanoi, Hue, and Ho Chi Minh
City, but had reached a proportion of 4%-5% of the population by
267. Carlyle A. Thayer, “Russian Subs in Vietnam,” U.S. Naval Institute, August 20,
2012 http://news.usni.org/2012/08/20/russian-subs-vietnam.
268. “Vietnam P.M. Inspects First Russian-built Submarine,” Thanh Nien News, May
14, 2013 http://www.thanhniennews.com/index/pages/20130514-vietnam-pm-inspects-
first-russian-built-submarine.aspx.
269. Rajaram Panda, Vietnam and China: Patching Up? Institute of Peace and Con-
flict Studies, Southeast Asia Article #4005, June 24, 2013 http://www.ipcs.org/article/
southeast-asia/vietnam-and-china-patching-up-4005.html.
270. “Rare Protest in Vietnam Raises a Call to Curb China,” New York Times. June
3, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/03/world/asia/rare-protest-in-vietnam-raises-
call-to-curb-china.html?_r=0.
271. Agent Orange and Type 2 Diabetes, American Diabetes Association http://
www.diabetes.org/living-with-diabetes/complications/agent-orange-and-type-2-diabetes.
html.
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2002. As of 2008, nearly 7% of adults aged between 30-69 had dia-
betes.272 The advancement of diabetes care in Vietnam was delayed
and only recently has become a national priority, beginning with
the National Diabetes Program administered by Vietnam’s Ministry
of Health and the World Health Organization for the Western Pa-
cific from February 2004 through December 2010. Even the health
of young children, aged 6 to 11, have been increasingly at risk, with
childhood obesity in Ho Chi Minh City having increased from
12.2% in 1997 to 38.5% in 2012; while 42.9% of children under 5
years-old are underweight or stunted.273 Although, many of the dia-
betic patients have been examined to be of normal body composi-
tion, indicating that only minor changes in modes of transportation
and diet, from active lifestyles with simple diets in rural areas to
more sedentary lifestyles and less nutritious diets in urban centers,
may be enough to create the onset of diabetes.274
While only 12% of the Vietnamese are considered overweight
or obese and 29% do not have sufficient physical activity, 80.4%
have low fruit and vegetable consumption, 30% have high choles-
terol, and 56.5% of Vietnamese men smoke.275 In addition to a dia-
betes epidemic, cardiovascular disease, and several other NCDs
have led to an overwhelming death toll. From 1986 to 1997, NCD
deaths in Vietnam rose from 42% of all deaths to 62%;276 the rate
of NCD deaths in Vietnam finally tapered in 2009 at 63.3%.277
Thus, both lifestyle and environmental factors are currently being
studied to uncover rampant sources of NCD.
By 2028, it is expected that 2.5 million Vietnamese will have
diabetes and another 1.9 million will be at high risk to contract the
272. PHUNG Thi Thu Phuong, Managing the Burden of Diabetes in Vietnam. World
Health Organization, Western Pacific Region, November 14, 2012 http://www.wpro.
who.int/vietnam/mediacentre/features/feature_world_diabetes_day_2012_vietnam/en/
index.html.
273. “HCM City Looks to Combat Rising Child Obesity,” Vietnam News, April 6,
2013 http://vietnamnews.vn/society/237870/hcm-city-looks-to-combat-rising-child-
obesity.html.
274. TRAN Quang Khanh, In Thomas Fuller, “Diabetes Is the Price Vietnam Pays
for Progress,” New York Times, June 4, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/world/
asia/diabetes-is-the-price-vietnam-pays-for-progress.html?pagewanted=all.
275. Regional Meeting on National Multisectoral Plans for NCD Prevention and
Control. Meeting Report, World Health Organization, Western Pacific Region, Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, June 11-14, 2012, p. 6.
276. Vietnam Ministry of Health, Vietnam Health Statistics Yearbook 1997, Hanoi.
277. Regional Meeting on National Multisectoral Plans for NCD Prevention and
Control. Meeting Report, World Health Organization, Western Pacific Region, Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, June 11-14, 2012, p. 6.
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disease, a stark increase from 1.3 million people diagnosed with dia-
betes and 1.1 million at risk as of 2008.278 NGUYEN Thi Lam of
Vietnam’s National Nutrition Institute indicates that 90% of the
Vietnamese people with diabetes suffer from Type 2, which is typi-
cally preventable or managed through lifestyle choices. She fears
earlier estimates of the epidemic may be modest, citing that 7 to 8
million people could be suffering from the disease by 2025.279 The
growing concern over diabetes in Vietnam has triggered a con-
certed effort by domestic and foreign governments to curtail the
epidemic.
In 2001, the Center for Disease Control opened its first Viet-
nam-based office in Hanoi.280 Thereupon, the Prime Minister’s De-
cision No. 35/2001/QD-TTg on Ratification of National Strategy for
People’s Health Care 2001-2010, No. 77/2002/QD-TTg on Ratifica-
tion of Program for Prevention and Control of Certain Non-Com-
municable Diseases 2002-2010, and Government Resolution No. 12/
2000/NQ-CP on National Tobacco Control Policy 2000-2010 have
included health conscious initiatives spelled out by the central gov-
ernment to reduce diabetes as well as cardiovascular disease,281
often through support of civil service organizations (CSO).
One aspect of government initiatives has been to develop com-
munity-based approaches that improve control and the treatment
quality of diabetes, such as the National Hospital of Endocrinology
in Hanoi’s and World Diabetes Foundation’s co-sponsored project
during 2006 that aimed to raise awareness and screen residents of
the Thanh Hoa and Thai Binh provinces, with the goal to reduce
undiagnosed diabetes to less than 60%, from over 80% in 2002.282
In July 2012, the Vietnam Diabetes Care Program (VDCP) was
launched, a collaboration between Vietnam’s Ministry of Health
and Denmark’s Novo Nordisk Vietnam, a Danish healthcare com-
278. IDF Grant Supports Diabetes Screening and Prevention Program in Vietnam.
International Diabetes Federation http://www.idf.org/node/1431.
279. NGUYEN Thi Lam, Over 6% of Vietnam Population Suffer from Diabetes.
Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations, Hanoi, May 13, 2013 http://www.ngocen
tre.org.vn/news/over-6-vietnam-population-suffer-diabetes.
280. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. CDC in Vietnam http://www.cdc.
gov/globalhealth/countries/vietnam/.
281. HOANG Van Minh, Epidemiology of Cardiovascular Disease in Rural Viet-
nam, Umea University Medical Dissertation No. 1018, Umea, Sweden, 2006, p. 10 http:/
/umu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:144495/FULLTEXT01.
282. Clive S. Cockram, TA Van Binh, and Gauden Galea, “Diabetes Prevention and
Control in Vietnam: A Demonstration Project in Two Provinces,” Practical Diabetes
International, 23:8 (October 2006), p. 362.
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pany and provider of diabetes care.283 Also, Ho Chi Minh City’s
Nutrition Program for 2013-2015 has been launched where the city
plans to spend VND42.75 billion to prevent malnutrition, obesity,
and vitamin deficiencies.284
Just as Vietnam faces numerous public health challenges, the
economy has become stagnant and now the financial health of the
country is also in question. In some respects, Vietnam’s ability to
successfully grow its economy over the past decades has created a
situation where, on a global scale, Vietnam is a haven for foreign
investors. As an example, the United States GDP growth slowed to
1.8% in the first quarter of 2013, modestly up from .4% in the
fourth quarter of 2012 while the GDP growth in Vietnam expanded
4.89% year-over-year from the first quarter of 2012 to the first
quarter of 2013, although much of the increase in the GDP figure
can be attributed to inflation, which stood at 6.64% in March
2013.285
Foreign investors who do not heavily rely on domestic
purchases of goods and services are able to enjoy the benefits of
increasing prices through revenues. In order to keep up with infla-
tion, interest rates on deposits are accordingly high, with a one-year
certificate of deposit on a minimum of VND10 million yielding
about 6.81%.286 The high interest rates yielded in depository ac-
counts attract foreign companies to keep profits in Vietnam or to
purchase Vietnamese dong bonds, yielding 8.8375% on the 10-year
debt instrument and 8.9375% on the 15-year.287 In fact, the State
Bank of Vietnam (SBV) initially sought to reduce liquidity, as for-
eign capital inflows were overwhelming. Over several days, the
SBV purchased in excess of $500 million USD in order to monetize
283. Embassy of Denmark in Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
Press Release: New Public-Private Partnership to Improve Diabetes Care in Vietnam.
July 11, 2012 http://vietnam.um.dk/da/om-os/nyheder-fra-ambassaden/newsdisplaypage/
?newsid=f1351ec8-af83-44a1-b570-c167d12528cd.
284. “HCM City Looks to Combat Rising Child Obesity,” Vietnam News, April 6,
2013 http://vietnamnews.vn/society/237870/hcm-city-looks-to-combat-rising-child-
obesity.html.
285. “Vietnam GDP Growth Slows in First Quarter as Banks Struggle,” Bloomberg
News, March 27, 2013 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-27/vietnam-economic-
growth-slows-in-first-quarter-as-banks-struggle.html.
286. HSBC Bank Vietnam http://vietnam.deposits.org/providers/hsbc-vietnam.html.
287. HO Binh Minh and Martin Petty, “Vietnam Bond Yields Hit Record Lows,
Market Grows Fast,” Reuters, June 5, 2013 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/05/
vietnam-bonds-yields-idUSL3N0EH14V20130605.
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the deposits and curb inflationary pressure.288 Then, as the econ-
omy slowed in the past year, Vietnam withdrew approximately 90%
of its cash from foreign currency investments,289 and the State Trea-
sury and Vietnam Bank for Social Policies plan to auction an addi-
tional 3 trillion dong or about $143 million USD.290
Foreign investors continue to enjoy comparatively high growth
rates while Vietnamese citizens find it challenging to keep up with
price increases amid an economic slowdown; the consumer price
index rose by 9.21% from 2011 to 2012.291 Corporations are exper-
iencing similar fiscal challenges. The SBV has committed to satisfy-
ing financial conglomerates and other large enterprises’ short-term
liquidity needs. A slew of bad debt prompted Deputy Prime Minis-
ter VU Van Ninh and Central Bank Governor NGUYEN Van Binh
to chair a panel for the restructuring of banks by 2015.292
A third source of unhappiness for the Vietnamese is the lack of
democratic freedoms granted to citizens. NGUYEN Phuoc Tuong,
a former advisor to two prime ministers from 1991 to 2006, recently
described the Vietnamese government by saying that the “system is
the totalitarian rule of one party.”293 In June 2013, notorious world-
wide web blogger PHAM Viet Dao was arrested for criticizing the
government, the 38th blogger arrested during the year, a figure sim-
ilar to that of 2012.294 Considering that Vietnamese Internet sub-
scriptions increased from 200,000 in 2000 to 8 million in 2010, and
288. Central Bank to Issue Bonds to Check Inflation. Press and Information Depart-
ment, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1, 2013 http://www.vietnamembassy-
brunei.org/vnemb.vn/tinkhac/ns070815155319.
289. Central Bank to Issue Bonds to Check Inflation. Press and Information Depart-
ment, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1, 2013 http://www.vietnamembassy-
brunei.org/vnemb.vn/tinkhac/ns070815155319.
290. HO Binh Minh and Martin Petty, “Vietnam Bond Yields Hit Record Lows,
Market Grows Fast,” Reuters, June 5, 2013 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/05/
vietnam-bonds-yields-idUSL3N0EH14V20130605.
291. Vietnam General Statistics Office, Monthly Statistical Information, Social-eco-
nomic situation in 2012 http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=622&ItemID=13501.
292. Jason Folmanis, Diep Ngoc PHAM, and Ailing TAN, “Vietnam GDP Growth
Slows in First Quarter as Banks Struggle,” Bloomberg News, March 27, 2013 http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-27/vietnam-economic-growth-slows-in-first-quarter-
as-banks-struggle.html.
293. Thomas Fuller, In “Hard Times, Open Dissent and Repression Rise in Viet-
nam,” New York Times, April 23, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/world/asia/
vietnam-clings-to-single-party-rule-as-dissent-rises-sharply.html.
294. “Vietnam Government Critic Arrested,” New York Times, June 14, 2013 http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/06/15/world/asia/vietnam-government-critic-arrested.html.
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are projected to double by 2020,295 freedom of speech and press on
the Internet may serve as a relevant generalizable proxy.
Granted, the SRV has taken several steps to open forums for
political discourse. On January 2, 2013, in accordance with Resolu-
tion 38/2012/QH13 adopted by the National Assembly on Novem-
ber 23, 2012, draft revisions to the 1992 Constitution were made
available for public comment; from at home and abroad, 26 million
suggestions were submitted. Two months later, in March 2013, Viet-
nam hosted Amnesty International for the first time since the end
of the Vietnam War. Included was a meeting with two dissidents,
PHAM Hong Son and NGUYEN Van Dai, representatives of the
main evangelical churches, and Cardinal Jean-Baptiste PHAM
Minh Man, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Ho Chi Minh
City.296
On June 3, 2013, the National Assembly held a live television
debate featuring draft amendments to the 1992 Constitution, and
decided that Article 54, involving the orientation of economic sec-
tors, would remain unchanged given their preference to a socialist-
oriented economy that aims to ensure members of society enjoy ec-
onomic benefits in a more equal manner.297 There are numerous
other amendments that have been focused on in the public realm.
On January 22, 2013, Minister of Justice NGUYEN Dinh Loc and
72 other politicians and intellectuals, announced Petition 72 on the
Internet calling for the repeal of Article 4, stipulating that the Com-
munist Party has the highest position of leadership, in an attempt to
achieve a multiparty system of government. Other aspects of the
petition included requests to submit an application to the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and calls for a
modification in the government’s structure to include a system of
checks and balances.298
295. Anne Nelson, “Vietnam Fighting a Losing Battle Against Free Speech Online,”
Public Broadcasting Station, January 6, 2011 http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2011/01/
vietnam-fighting-a-losing-battle-against-free-speech-online006.
296. Gerry Mullany, “Vietnam Allows Visit by Amnesty International,” New York
Times, March 6, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/world/asia/vietnam-allows-
amnesty-international-visit.html.
297. “NA Debates Revised Constitution,” Vietnam News Agency, March 6, 2013
http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/NA-debates-revised-Constitution/20136/35151.vnplus.
298. YOSHIHARU Tsuboi, “Intellectuals, Others Propose Multi-party System in
Vietnamese Constitutional Reforms,” The Asahi Shimbun, April 29, 2013 http://ajw.
asahi.com/article/forum/politics_and_economy/AJ201304290010.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In the fall of 1945, after reporting on numerous meetings held
by interest groups throughout rural and urban Vietnam, journalist
NGUYEN Bach Khoa concluded: “The first impression- and also
the last impression- that I had was that from the August uprising to
the present, the Vietnamese masses have just begun to learn. . .to
speak. Indeed, under French domination, the Vietnamese masses
never ‘spoke’ at all.”299 Vietnam’s political tendencies after transi-
tioning from a colonized, occupied state that was continually under
duress of civil war and cultural conflict to an independent nation
upon an unwavering defense against the world’s superpower may
be explained by the historical landscape. In Vietcong Colonel Gen-
eral TRAN Van Tra’s own words during his service of the early
1970’s:300
I was about to return to the green jungle [from Hanoi],
where the battlefield was on fire with fighting, back to my
combat units. I was eager and happy to get back. . .maybe
it was because I yearned all my life for independence and
freedom and had pledged to bear arms and fight until the
final objective was reached. . .Everything was for the
revolution. One for all, all for one.
The Vietnamese embraced the Marxist-Leninist ideals of a socialist-
communist political form of governance; a system viewed by free-
dom fighters and civilians as liberating considering the lack of free-
doms guaranteed to ethnic-Vietnamese as a consequence of foreign
aggression and occupation.
While Vietnam may be a one-party state, it is not a dictator-
ship. Once policy is agreed upon, it is unanimously defended.301
However, the political process is not unlike a democracy. Making
policy in Vietnam involves all the alliance building, plotting, and
antagonism expected in democratic societies. The political setting is
complex and fluid, loyalties and allegiances change. Reformers,
conservers, and advocacy coalitions hope to receive the benefits of
299. In Shawn Frederick McHale, Print and Power: Confucianism, Communism, and
Buddhism in the Making of Modern Vietnam, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2004,
p. 39.
300. TRAN Van Tra, “Comradeship,” in David Chanoff & DOAN Van Toai, eds.,
‘Vietnam:’ A Portrait of its People At War, London: Tauris Parke, 2009, pp. 172-173.
301. Hayton, Rising Dragon, supra note 3, p. 110.
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patronage.302 However, the competing factions’ ideological differ-
ences have not yet crystallized into coherent positions across
issues.303
Over time, economic reformers gained esteem through suc-
cesses associated with doi moi and the Socio-Economic Develop-
ment Strategy Plans. The market reform implemented in the Five-
Year Plans of 1986-1990 and 1991-1995 was based on a strategy of
endogenous growth. Collectivization during the late 1970’s sought
to optimize labor processes and distribution of capital in order to
increase total output. Central planning of Vietnam’s fertile grounds
proved to be deficient in sustaining inhabitants due to food
shortages while reliance on imports further strained the production
efficiency frontier. Economic renovation reduced emphasis on the
agricultural sector and incremental adoption of neo-liberal ap-
proaches to commerce enabled the inclusion of market intangibles
that were previously considered external to the creation of surplus
value.
The advent of a three-sector economy served to privatize, and
provide opportunity, for new business activities. The endogenous
growth model produced multiple equilibriums that allowed for dis-
crete jumps within the stationary state and accumulation regime of
yesteryear.304 Despite perceived strict government oversight, eco-
nomic growth was loosely guided. Cultural disparity between ethnic
Chinese and Vietnamese, as well as divisions between urban and
rural communities, contributed to a lack of coherence.
The Socio-Economic Development Strategy Plan of 2001-2010
built on the growth model through investments in sectors with large
potential for spillovers, such as areas related to human resources,
education, and training. And, while economic expansion boomed
amid the cultivation of a major cash crop (coffee) deteriorating en-
vironmental conditions caused Vietnam’s economic initiatives to
shift from productivity to sustainability, given the still significant
agricultural sector. Despite heavy foreign direct investment inflows
during the 1980’s and early 1990’s from China and particularly the
Soviet Union, it was not until Vietnam opened its doors to the rest
of the world that socio-economic objectives could be fully realized.
302. Martin Gainsborough, “From Patronage to ‘Outcomes:’ Vietnam’s Communist
Party Congresses Reconsidered,” Journal of Vietnamese Studies, 21, (2007), pp. 3-26.
303. Hayton, Rising Dragon, supra note 4, p. 110.
304. Juhana Vartiainen, “The Economics of Successful State Intervention in Indus-
trial Transformation,” in Meredith Woo-Cumings, (ed.), The Developmental State, Ith-
aca, New York: Cornell University, 1999, p. 206.
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Vietnam’s accession into the WTO and ASEAN solidified ad-
vancement from doi moi, or production economics, to socio-eco-
nomics. On one hand, membership into the WTO stimulated global
investment and trade activities with western powers such as the
United States, but also guaranteed enforcement of recourse
through sanctions in transactions involving member WTO nations
within the Asia-Pacific, which the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC) failed to accomplish.305 On the other hand, ASEAN
introduced new ideologies and methods of organization that Viet-
nam was previously unaccustomed to: voluntarism and consensus
rather than central planning and authoritarian rule.
Hierarchical systems had been long established by the
Vietnamese through Confucianism. Renowned scholar and Prime
Minister of Japanese-controlled Vietnam from March to August
1945, TRAN Trong Kim, attributes Vietnam’s hierarchical, though
reformative disposition to discrepancies between old and new: “If
those in authority are noted for their talent and ethics, people will
abide by hierarchical rules without complaint. When such persons
fail to elicit admiration from the people. . .the more people will
resent them and find such efforts unjustified. At present, when dif-
ferences between the old and new are still unclear, many suspect
that the old hinders progress and should be abolished and that new
learning should be adopted.”306 Vietnam’s adoption of new meth-
odologies, often those devised and exercised by other societies, in-
sinuates political economic progression transcribed through
influence by trending practices.
For example, upon gaining independence, Vietnam’s coopera-
tive farming and closed market system aimed to mimic Soviet styles
of economy. Despite failure to generate increases in output year-
over-year, which could have actually been the result of uncontrolla-
ble factors such as weather, the SRV achieved the highest degrees
of structural organization. Next, open market systems, international
trade, and entrepreneurialism became fashionable given western
prosperity and the SRV was inclined to economic reform. Shortly
thereafter, Vietnam established itself as a developing nation exper-
iencing accelerated growth as a global giant in the exportation of
commodities. Finally, issues of corruption, sustainability, and happi-
305. Mark Beeson, Institutions of the Asia-Pacific: ASEAN, APEC, and Beyond.
London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2009, p. 50.
306. TRAN Trong Kim, “Confucianism,” in George E. Dutton, Jayne S. Werner, and
John K. Whitmore, eds., Sources of Vietnamese Tradition, New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2012, p. 415.
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ness became dominant western mantras that were accepted as pub-
lic challenges in Vietnam. In response, the SRV set forth the Socio-
Economic Strategy Plan of 2001-2010; the results have been positive
in terms of garnering support for political and civil reform.
The South China Sea maritime dispute will largely dictate po-
litical economic conditions moving forward. The territorial conflict
has the potential to implicate claimants of the Sea and its islands,
which include both ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries, in addi-
tion to western and eastern allies. As stakeholders struggle to exer-
cise geopolitical influence, institutional systems will likely follow
suit. Meanwhile, joint ventures in the South China Sea energy space
have the potential to create utilities of scale for cooperative nations,
which could greatly benefit both economic and environmental ini-
tiatives. As for unhappiness of Vietnam’s citizens, reallocation of
vital resources toward military expenditure has created a shortage
of public services, while the public’s thirst continues to yearn for
expanding democratic freedoms.
A voluntary and consensus approach is effective only when na-
tions choose to oblige; the result will be largely reflective of the
outcomes inherent to the South China Sea maritime dispute. Viet-
nam’s approach to combating major challenges is also indicative of
both the governments and citizens’ willingness to not only comply,
but also to make initial sacrifices without initially knowing the po-
tential consequences. Vietnam has proven to be successful in fol-
lowing trends, building capacity and improving the majority of
citizens’ living standards over time. Also, considering the advent of
CSO’s in Vietnam, which was a movement partially trail-blazed by
international imperatives such as the ASEAN community pro-
ject;307 a new sector is conscientiously addressing issues of public
health, awareness, and freedom.
For Vietnam to overcome its major challenges, it can no longer
be a trend follower. New ideas must be adapted to mesh with old
traditions, without excessive intrusion of newly popular methods
that have the potential to alter Vietnam’s natural richness and deter
society from reaching its own full potential. At the same time, citi-
zens look to public nodes of authority for guidance. Each year at
T?t, the lunar year, the following slogan appears on billboards:
“Mung Dang, Mung Xuan; Greet the Party, Greet Spring.” Just as
307. Helen E. S. Nesadurai, “The ASEAN People’s Forum (APF) As Authentic So-
cial Forum: Regional Civil Society Networking for An Alternative Regionalism,” in
Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism,
London: Taylor & Francis, 2012, p. 169.
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sure as spring will come, the SRV’s influence is cemented into na-
tional life, illustrating Vietnam’s political economy is not yet
exemplary.
